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L Introduction
Should parties be free to opt out of securities regulation' by private
agreement? Several securities law scholars have called for selective securities
law deregulation, couching their arguments in law and economics theory and
repeatedly emphasizing the costs of regulation.2 Yet should economic consid-
1. The terms "securities regulation" and "securities laws" when used in thisArticle refer
generally to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, and comparable state securities laws and regulations. Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § § 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 111996); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. 111996).
2. See, e.g., Park McGinty, The LimitedLiability Company: Opportunity for Selective
Securities Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 369 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein, Form and
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erations, such as reducing costs, promoting economic freedom, and maximiz-
ing allocative efficiency, effectively trump all other policy concerns? Should
we allow investors to waive the protections of the securities laws or are these
Faustian bargains3 that the state should refuse to enforce?4 Would selective
deregulation actually prove to be more efficient, equitable, and predictable
than the current regulatory regime?
The proposals calling for selective securities law deregulation are only
one of many recent reform initiatives that are testing the limits of private
contracting. The current trend toward private governance and reform mea-
sures that advocate rules over standards, certainty over flexibility, law over
facts, and individualism over community are quietly changing the law in many
contexts.' The debate, in this and other contexts, is important because it raises
basic questions about the proper scope of government and the values to be
served by regulation. The debate concerning selective securities law deregula-
tion is particularly significant because it dramatically illustrates a clash of
American values. It pits freedom of contract against the fundamental policies
that underlie the securities laws, including socially-directed values such as
fairness, equity, the protection of investors, the need for public confidence in
capital markets, and the deterrence of fraud.
This Article examines the proposals for selective securities law deregula-
tion from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Part II discusses the
new conservatism in private law and the current trend toward private order-
ing. Part III provides an overview of proposed securities law reform measures
and outlines the arguments in favor of selective securities law deregula-
tion and allowing parties to contractually opt out of securities regulation.
After considering the policies that underlie the securities laws and exploring
the effects of permitting parties to contract out of this statutory scheme,
Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited Liability Companies, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (1994) [hereinafter Ribstein, Form and Substance]; Larry E.
Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Ribstein, Private Ordering].
3. Faust is a legendary and literary figure who sold his soul to the devil for knowledge,
power, and material gain. WEBSTER'STHRDNEWINERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 829 (1971).
4. An analogous debate rages in bankruptcy law. Steven Schwarcz posed a similar
question in his article Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm. Schwarcz
asked, "May debtors and creditors contract in advance to change [the statutory] relationship?
Or would these contracts be 'Faustian' bargains that the state should not enforce?" Steven L.
Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEx. L. REv. 515,
516 (1999). In the bankruptcy law context, Schwarcz concluded that "externalities should not
render a prebankruptcy contract, or indeed any other contract, unenforceable if each class of
affected persons benefits overall, even though some of those persons individually may turn out
to be harmed." Id. at 603 (footnote omitted).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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Part IV argues against deregulation and the freedom to opt out of securities
regulation.
The proponents of selective deregulation would have us believe that the
reform measures simply present a choice of rules over standards, certainty
over flexibility, and law over facts. The thesis of this Article is that the
reform initiatives have much broader implications - they present a choice of
values.' The reform initiatives raise fundamental questions about the proper
role of government and the purposes served by regulation, and thus require the
reexamination of issues that have remained dormant since the New Deal. To
understand the difficulties and dangers that the reform initiatives present, it
is necessary first to review the events that gave rise to the securities laws and
the reasons for their current scope and mandatory nature. Part IV.A begins by
providing a brief overview of the history, objectives, scope, and structure of
the securities laws.7 The focus of the Article then shifts to discussing the
values served by securities regulation, particularly the securities laws' extra-
legal and moral implications.8 This Article argues that the opting-out initia-
tives are philosophically inconsistent with the underlying tenets of the securi-
ties laws. The adoption of such measures would therefore undermine both the
objectives and the basic theoretical framework of the securities laws.' The
Article also takes issue with the characterization of opting-out proposals as
merely logical extensions of contractarian reform measures, arguing instead
that the reform initiatives actually represent a misapplication of contractual
default theory." In addition, this Article demonstrates that the common law
has not been, and in the near future is not likely to be, an adequate substitute
for statutory protections." Without convincing evidence that the costs of
securities regulation outweigh the benefits, radical alteration of the current
regulatory scheme is notjustified.12 Even the limited experiments proposed
by the advocates of deregulation pose substantial risks. 3
This Article also challenges the premise that bright-line rules, such as
opting out by entity type or waiver, promote fairness, equity, equality, predict-
ability, efficiency, and utility better than the current regulatory scheme.14 Part
IV.B demonstrates that if our goal is to promote fairness, equity, and equal
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.A.1.
8. See infra Part IV.A.2.
9. See infra Part IV.A.3.
10. See infra Part IV.A.4.
11. See infra Part IV.A.5.
12. See infra Part IV.A.6.
13. See infra Part IV.A.7.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
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treatment, the existing regulatory structure furthers these objectives better
than bright-line rules, such as deregulation by private agreement. 5 If our
objective is to promote predictability, efficiency, and utility, the current
regulatory regime may prove more predictable, more efficient, and more
useful than the rules proposed by the advocates of selective deregulation. 6
Finally, this Article questions whether we should permit parties to waive
their rights and bargain away their statutory protections.' 7 The proponents of
selective deregulation are asking us to abandon long-standing policies favor-
ing investor protection' to adopt reforms that are premised on myths, not
reality.' 9 Part IV.C argues that the reform initiatives would result in the
adoption of industry-protective terms that individual investors would have
little or no power to change, thereby actually reducing competition. The
reform initiatives would also encourage securities-industry professionals to
lure investors into Faustian bargains. The reform measures would permit
these professionals to take advantage of investors at a time when they lack
bargaining power, knowledge, and an appreciation of the rights that they are
waiving. Neither the market nor warning legends would adequately protect
investors.20 The inevitable abuses that would flow from such a practice would
lead to litigation concerning whether waivers under these circumstances can
be knowing, voluntary, and intentional.2 '
This Article does not suggest that legislators, regulators, or courts should
disregard commercial reality and economic considerations. Concerns about
the costs and regulatory burdens of the securities laws are well founded.
Nevertheless, many of these concerns could be addressed with reform mea-
sures much less drastic than selective deregulation.' Legislators, regulators,
and academics should direct their efforts to improving and perfecting the
securities laws by taking into account the laws' economic effect, but such
reforms must be consistent with the basic theoretical framework of the securi-
ties laws. Continued efforts to simplify existing securities regulations, addi-
tional initiatives to expand and streamline registration exemptions, and further
measures to simplify, reduce, and clarify disclosure requirements would
address some of these concerns. Such measures could be designed to deal
with the economic concerns raised by the advocates of deregulation, without
15. See infra Part IV.B.1.
16. See infra Part IV.B.2.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. See infra Part IV.C. 1.
19. See infra Part IV.C.2.
20. See infra Part IV.C.3.
21. See infra Part IV.C.4.
22. See infra Part V.
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compromising the underlying values of the securities laws, such as investor
protection. The answer is not to choose between the free market and govern-
ment regulation. Rather than swinging the pendulum back and adopting
deregulatory measures, legislators and regulators should work toward a more
balanced approach by adopting measured solutions that would bridge the gap
between philosophical extremes.
1I. The New Conservatism in Private Law and the Current Trend
Toward Private Ordering
In the last five to fifteen years, private law has become more conserva-
tive.' There is considerable evidence that we are witnessing a retreat from
the progressive principles and activism of the 1960s and 1970s and experienc-
ing a resurgence of conservative, individualist, laissez-faire ideology. In
contract law, for example, Ralph Mooney observed that many courts have
substantially abandoned the liberal, interventionist, egalitarian, policy-ori-
ented contract jurisprudence of the 1960s and 1970s in favor of a more
conservative, classical, conceptualist approach that emphasizes freedom of
contract and marketplace economics.24 Mooney's study documents a return
to narrow rules of formation, strict application of the parol evidence rule, and
limitations on implied obligations such as good faith.2 In tort law, the re-
trenchment is evidenced by the tort reform movement, restrictions on strict
products liability and other enterprise liability, and the Restatement (Third)
of Torts on products liability.26 This jurisprudential and political shift has
resulted in the emergence of a new conservatism that prefers rules over
standards, certainty over flexibility, law over facts, and individualism over
community.27
This new conservatism, coupled with the public's disenchantment with
government regulation, has inspired numerous campaigns for regulatory
23. The new conservatism in private law was the topic of ajoint program sponsored by
the Sections on Contracts, Property Law, and Tort and Compensation Systems at the Associa-
tion ofAnerican Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting in San Francisco, California on January
10, 1998. Panelists discussed various developments in contract, property, and tort law that
indicate a substantial retrenchment and the emergence of a new conservatism in the substance
and form of private law. See Association of American Law Schools, 1998 Annual Meeting,
Program, 99-101, Jan. 6-10, 1998, San Francisco, California [hereinafter AALS Program].
24. See Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1131, 1133-35 (1995). Mooney studied reported contract decisions in nine western states,
but indicated the new conceptualism in contract law is a national phenomenon. See id. at
1133 n.9.
25. See id at 1135, 1145-46, 1170,1186.
26. See AALS Program, supra note 23, at 100.
27. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 24, at 1133-34; AALSProgram, supra note 23, at 100.
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reform and privatization" in various contexts.29 The current trend toward
private governance is evidenced by reform measures as diverse as the privat-
ization of schools" and prisons,31 the growth in private dispute resolution,32
and the increasing contractualization of family structures.3 This growing
movement is characterized by demands for deregulation, privatization, con-
tractualism, and decentralization.3 Reform initiatives are often accompanied
by calls for the dismantling of the regulatory state and for returning responsi-
bility to individuals and the private sector. Proponents tend to prefer the
ordering of the private market to that of public decision-makers and express
a commitment to the values of individualism, market integrity, and liberty.35
Advocates of regulatory reform charge that current regulatory policiesjeopar-
dize competition, stifle entrepreneurial activity, suppress economic growth,
and inhibit job creation. 6
28. The term "privatization" is used here in its broadest sense, to include any arrangement
that would shift government responsibilities to the marketplace.
29. See, e.g., Symposium, The New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 993 (1996)
(exploring current trend toward private governance in provision of public services, labor and
employment law, family law, and land use law).
30. Examples include school voucher programs and private companies running public
schools. See, e.g., Carol Innerst, School-Choice Proposals MountAlong With Public's Unhap-
piness, WASH. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at A4; Bill Zlatos, Privatizing Schools Tests Pittsburgh
Suburb, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1995, at B6.
31. For example, in some jurisdictions private companies are building and administering
prisons. See, e.g., Kristin Bloomer, Private Punishment: When it Comes to the Business of
Running Prisons, There Are Pros and Cons, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 1997, at A3; Matthew
Purdy, In Jail Business, Nashville Company Leads Crowded Field, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1996,
at B4. See generally Symposium, Privatization of Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987)
(discussing legal implications of prison privatization programs and reporting statistics on
privatization of public services).
32. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, MandatoryArbitration ofIndividualEmploy-
ment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996)
(analyzing trend toward mandatory arbitration of statutory employment rights).
33. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatoryfor Sexual Marginorities: Not
Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENy. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996) (arguing that privatization and
contractualization of family structures may provide means for progressive protection of
marginorities).
34. See Julie A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 993,
995 (1996).
35. See id at 995-98.
36. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U. CmI. L. REv. 1463, 1481 (1996) (quoting Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds.,
Contract with America: The BoldPlan byRep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. DickArmey, andthe House
Republicans to Change the Nation, TIMES, 128 (1994), and discussing rationale advanced by
Republicans in connection with proposed "Contract With America" and related promises to
initiate substantive changes in existing regulatory structure).
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Recent corporate and securities law reform initiatives reflect this current
trend toward deregulation and private ordering.37 A number of corporate law
scholars have argued that business organizations should be free to opt out of
certain corporate and securities law requirements by private agreement. 8
These contractarians who advocate permitting organizations the freedom to
opt out of regulatory constraints view business entities as essentially creatures
of contract. They argue that business organizations should be free to shape
their own contractual arrangements without government interference. Con-
tractarians contend that the primary function of corporate law should be to
facilitate private contracting and promote economic efficiency.
Contractarians already have had a significant impact on corporate law
scholarship,39 the direction of the law, and legal reform efforts. For instance,
many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that allow shareholders to adopt
charter provisions that limit or eliminate the personal liability of directors for
monetary damages flowing from a breach of their common law duty of care.40
Such statutes basically allow shareholders to contract out of common law
constraints and adopt a different fiduciary standard. Another example of this
37. See, e.g., Symposium, The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871 (1993) (examining American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance from various theoretical perspectives); Symposium, ContractualFree-
dom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (exploring ongoing debate over
mandatory versus enabling corporate rules); Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated
Firm, 54 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 389 (1997) (discussing issues related to freedom of contract and
fiduciary duties); see also infra note 38 (providing citations to articles discussing securities law
reform initiatives).
38. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreward: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-98 (1989); see, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983) (criticizing insider
trading rules and contending that firms, as a matter of contract, should be permitted to allocate
property rights in valuable information to managers orto investors because parties' self-interest
will lead them to reach optimal allocation by private agreement); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983) (criticizing federal
proxy rules for displacing voluntary arrangements and arguing such rules impose costs that
probably outweigh any benefits); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New
Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9 (1984) (criticizing
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of insider trading prohibitions and suggesting
contract test as means for assigning property rights in information).
39. See generally Symposium, TheAmericanLaw lnstitute 'sPrinciplesofCorporate Gov-
ernance, supra note 37; Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-108-402(1) (West 1997); DEL. CODEANN. tit.
8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1998); WYO. STAT.ANN. § 17-16-202(b)(iv) (Michie 1997). Many states
have amended their corporations statutes to permit shareholders to limit or eliminate director
and/or officer liability. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M.PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DmECTORS: RiGHTS, DUTESAND LIABILrrs § 2.05, at 16 & n.1 (1984 & Supp.
1997), for citations to state statutes limiting or eliminating director and/or officer liability.
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contractarian trend is state limited liability company legislation. All states
have adopted legislation that permits businesses to organize as limited liability
companies,4 a form of business organization where members enjoy limited
personal liability and maximum flexibility in ordering the internal and exter-
nal affairs of the entity.42 The rapid adoption of limited liability company
legislation evidences a growing acceptance of the contractarian theory of
business associations, because the limited liability company is designed to
provide investors the freedom to shape their own contractual arrangements
with a minimum of mandatory constraints. "Check-the-box" regulations pro-
vide an additional illustration. The "check-the-box" tax classification rule43
permits limited liability companies and other unincorporated associations to
elect partnership tax treatment, even if they have corporate characteristics.'
The "check-the-box" approach also reflects the view that the law is nothing
more than a series of default rules that parties can avoid through appropriate
elections. Even more importantly, contractarians have had significant influ-
ence on the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance"
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.46 Such reform efforts relax manda-
tory requirements and permit those associated with an entity to determine
what rules shall govern. They permit parties to shape their own contractual
relationships by agreeing to opt out of previously mandatory constraints, such
as fiduciary duties, personal liability, and specific tax consequences.
Predictably, contractarian proposals have surfaced in the securities law
area. Regulatory reform advocates have presented a number ofproposals that
challenge the mandatory nature of the securities laws.47 In particular, some
securities law scholars have called for selective securities law deregulation
arguing that in certain contexts private parties should be permitted to opt out
41. See 1LARRYE.RIBSTEIN&ROBERTR.KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN&KEATNGEONLIMITED
LiABLrrY CoMA iES § 1.06 (1996).
42. See MARK A. SARGENT & WALTERD. SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LABiLrrY COMPANY
HANDBOOK §§ 1.01, 1.03, at 1-1, 1-3 to 1-5 (1996-97).
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1997).
44. See 1 RIBSTEIN&KEATINGF, supra note 41, § 14.06.
45. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1212, 1213, 1225-29 (1993) (discussing influence of law and economics
movement on American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project).
46. See Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 111, 141-49
(1993) (discussing contractarian perspectives pervasive in Revised Uniform Partnership Act);
Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
of.1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 535-75 (1993) (criticizing Revised Uniform Partnership Act for
its contractarian view).
47. See supra notes 2 & 38 for citations to articles challenging the mandatory nature of
the securities laws and advocating freedom to contract out of such constraints.
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of securities regulation by private agreement.48 Such reform initiatives repre-
sent a logical, but potentially dangerous, extension of the current trend toward
private ordering and the growing conservatism in the law.
III. Overview of Selective Deregulation Proposals
Park McGinty and Larry Ribstein are vocal advocates of selective dereg-
ulation in the securities law context. Both McGinty and Ribstein have pre-
sented specific proposals for securities law reform.49 Both scholars have
argued forcefully that in particular contexts private parties should be permit-
ted to opt out of securities regulation by private agreement. Both oppose
mandatory application of the securities laws in specific situations, support
selective securities law. deregulation, and urge private ordering through the
elimination of certain mandatory requirements."
Like other commentators advocating private ordering, McGinty and Rib-
stein couch their arguments in law and economic theory. They stress policy
goals such as the need to respect private preferences, promote economic
freedom, reduce regulatory costs, and increase productivity, efficiency, and
profitability." Like proponents of the new conservatism, McGinty and Rib-
stein advocate the adoption of simple, bright-line rules to promote certainty
and predictability that would in turn reduce adjudication and contracting
costs.52 They assume that such bright-line rules would also result in contro-
versies being determined by law rather than costly, fact-based, case-by-case
analysis. Both McGinty and Ribstein appear willing to sacrifice the interests
of the community to protect the economic interests of certain individuals. 3
A. McGinty's Proposal
In his article, The LimitedLiability Company: Opportunityfor Selective
Securities Law Deregulation, McGinty suggests that Congress should amend
the securities laws to allow participants in certain business ventures to choose
whether to be covered by the securities laws.54 Specifically, McGinty pro-
48. See supra note 2.
49. See supra note 2.
50. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 370-71; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2,
at 1, 5.
51. See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 2, at 369-70, 423; Ribstein, Form and Substance,
supra note 2, at 824; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 26.
52. See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 2, at 374-75,434-38; Ribstein, Form and Substance,
supra note 2, at 808-11, 825-26, 838-41.
53. See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 2, at423,426,440-41; Ribstein, Form andSubstance,
supra note 2, at 825-26, 835-36.
54. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 371, 423.
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poses that investors in limited liability companies be permitted to opt out of
securities law coverage, if potential investors are notified that the protections
of the securities laws will not apply.
55
McGinty reasons that legal rules, such as the securities laws, impose
substantial costs on businesses. 6 Reducing mandatory government regulation
obviates the need for activities unrelated to the fundamentals of the business
enterprise and therefore allows for more productive business behavior."
Decreasing regulatory costs increases a firm's productivity, efficiency, and
profitability 8
McGinty also contends that, given the flexible definition of the term
"security," it is often difficult to predict whether interests in some new busi-
ness entities will be deemed "securities" and therefore subject to the securities
laws. 9 As a result, business planners are forced to behave as though the
interests are securities, adding substantial costs to a transaction.6 ° Promoters
who fail to recognize that the interests may be securities, and hence fail to
comply with the securities laws, risk inadvertent exposure and may uninten-
tionally give purchasers a money-back guarantee.6' McGinty maintains that
businesses need clear direction in order to plan their affairs.62 Uncertainty
only adds "dead weight social costs."63
55. See id at 375, 437. McGinty proposes that Congress amend the statutory definitions
of the term "security" by adding the phrase "interests in limited liability companies other than
excluded LLC interests." McGinty then suggests adding a new term, "excluded LLC interests,"
to the general definitional sections of the securities laws. "Excluded LLC interests" would be
defined so as to allow limited liability companies to exclude themselves from coverage, if they
disclose the interests are not protected by the securities laws. See id. at 437.
56. See ide at 376.
57. See id at 369.
58. See id. at 370.
59. See id at 374.
60. See id. at 374-75.
61. See id. at 375, 426-28, 430. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 specifies:
Any person who (1) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5] of this title [the
registration provisions].., shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this section, to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. I 1996). Citing section 12, McGinty
argues that if an issuer fails to recognize its interests are securities or, for some other reason,
fails to comply with the Securities Act's offering requirements, the issuer, in essence, is pro-
viding investors with a year-long money-back guarantee or "put," with interest. See McGinty,
supra note 2, at 426-28.
62. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 373.
63. See id.
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Finally, McGinty argues that the costs of securities regulation may well
outweigh its benefits." First, securities regulation may not improve investors'
well-being. Second, recent case law has decreased the benefits of securities
law protections. Third, technical requirements create traps for the unwary and
encourage opportunism. Finally, vague tests, such as the investment contract
test for determining whether an interest is a security, result in arbitrary judi-
cial decisions and increase both the risks and costs for businesses. McGinty,
therefore, believes that experimentation in selective securities law deregula-
tion would be worthwhile and that such experimentation could provide a
means to empirically test whether the costs of securities regulation outweigh
the benefits.'
B. Ribstein's Proposals
Ribstein contends that parties should be allowed to contractually opt out
of securities law coverage." Ribstein advocates the adoption of a "private
ordering approach" that would permit parties to determine for themselves
whether the securities laws apply. 7 Under this approach, courts would
enforce clear waivers of securities law coverage." Ribstein reasons that the
parties to a transaction are better suited than legislators, courts, or regulators
to determine the amount of disclosure that is appropriate. 9 Ribstein argues
that the costs of the current regulatory system often exceed the benefits, 0
particularly because investors would still be protected from fraud by their
right to bring state common law fraud actions.7' The basic assumptions under-
lying his thesis are that voluntary transactions are efficient.and private prefer-
ences should be respected and enforced.72
64. See id. at 423-36.
65. See id. at 370-71, 441.
66. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812; Ribstein, Private Ordering,
supra note 2, at 5, 26.
67. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812.
68. See id. Ribstein acknowledges that courts might refuse to enforce certain waivers,
such as if there is uncertainty about an investor's intent to waive the protections of the securities
laws or if the investor lacks the capacity to protect his interests. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id at 834; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 30.
71. See Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 30, 33.
72. See id. at26 (stating that "[tihe central premise ofthe private ordering approach is that
voluntary transactions in developed markets are presumed to be efficient" and noting "[t]he
policy justifications for the private ordering approach relate to the propriety of enforcing con-
tracts").
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Alternatively, Ribstein suggests that courts apply an "intermediate private
ordering approach."'73 Here, Ribstein urges courts to rely on the form of the
investment, rather than the substance of the transaction, in defining a "secu-
rity."74 Ribstein proposes that investors and promoters be permitted to effec-
tively waive the securities laws by their selection of business association
form. 5 Under this approach, corporate stock and limited partnership interests
would continue to be characterized as securities; however, general partnership
interests and limited liability company interests would be presumed to be
nonsecurities.76 Use of a corporate or limited partnership organizational form
would therefore trigger application of the securities laws; whereas, use of a
general partnership or limited liability company organizational form would be
treated as a contractual waiver of securities law coverage.' Thus, the parties'
choice of entity and form of the investment would serve as a proxy for their
choice to elect or waive securities law coverage.
Ribstein maintains that his "intermediate private ordering approach"
eliminates the need for costly and unpredictable case-by-case analysis, avoids
the statutory prohibition against waiver, 8 allows courts to fashion a rule that
would apply only to transactions where mandatory disclosure is appropriate,
and insures investors will not be misled because investors would be warned
by the form of the transaction not to expect the protection of the securities
laws. 9 Ribstein argues that emphasizing choice of entity would reduce the
cost of regulatory compliance, increase predictability, decrease the amount of
litigation, and produce optimal disclosure. ° Ribstein contends that simple,
bright-line rules would decrease both adjudication and contracting costs.8
C. Characteristics Shared by the Reform Initiatives
Both McGinty and Ribstein are proposing selective securities law deregu-
lation measures. McGinty is advocating selective deregulation by entity type
when he proposes permitting limited liability companies to opt out of securi-
ties law coverage by private agreement. Similarly, Ribstein is advocating
selective deregulation by entity type when he urges courts to treat choice of
73. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812.
74. See id. at 810.
75. See id. at 827-28, 832.
76. See id. at 810, 814; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 41.
77. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 814, 832; Ribstein, Private
Ordering, supra note 2, at 24, 41-45, 55, 61.
78. See infra Part IV.A.I.c (discussing antiwaiver provisions).
79. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812.
80. See id. at 824.
81. See id. at 824, 826.
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entity as a waiver of securities law coverage. Ribstein's "private ordering
approach" would accomplish selective deregulation through waiver by allow-
ing parties to contractually opt out of securities law coverage. McGinty's and
Ribstein's proposals would not only free parties from burdensome disclosure
requirements, but would liberate them from the duty to comply with the
antifraud provisions as well.
Both commentators draw upon the basic tools of the law and economics
movement and employ cost-benefit analysis to support their calls for deregula-
tion. In their analysis, they stress policy goals such as reducing costs, promot-
ing economic freedom, and maximizing allocative efficiency. These econom-
ically-based policy considerations appear to effectively trump all other con-
cerns. Both commentators apparently view their proposals as first in a series
of securities law deregulation measures, thereby suggesting that adoption of
these reforms may have broader implications.'2 Consequently, we must con-
sider not only the practical effects of these specific reform proposals, but
long-range implications as well.
IV. The Case Against Selective Deregulation
A. The Role of Government and the Values Served by Regulation
Reform measures that would permit parties to opt out of securities regula-
tion by private agreement present both theoretical and practical concerns.
Advocates of selective securities deregulation, such as McGinty and Ribstein,
would have us believe that these proposals simply present a choice of bright-
line rules over standards, certainty over flexibility, and law over facts. But
these reform measures have much broader ramifications - they present a
choice ofvalues. The proposals require us to choose between the interests of
the community and the interests of particular individuals. The reform initia-
tives also raise fundamental questions about the proper role of government
and the purposes to be served by regulation, thereby forcing us to reexamine
issues that have remained dormant since the New Deal.83
82. For example, McGinty characterized his selective deregulation proposal as an
"experiment" and suggested that it could provide a means to test empirically whether the costs
of securities regulation outweigh the benefits. See McGinty, supra note 2, at441. In the article
Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case ofLimited Liability Compa-
nies, Ribstein noted that his analysis had broad implications:
This Article's analysis has implications that extend beyond [limited liability
companies]. The costs of applying an open-ended definition of"security" become
increasingly important as legislatures develop new types of firms, including limited
liability partnerships. Accordingly, the courts and legislatures must find ways to
accommodate the goals of the securities laws with those of financial markets.
Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 841 (footnote omitted).
83. In a broader context, Thomas McGarity observed that "the regulatory state is at a
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For example, McGinty's and Ribstein's preoccupation with economic
concerns causes them to lose sight of the purposes of the securities laws and
the values to be served by regulation. To understand the difficulties and
dangers that these reform initiatives present, it is necessary to first review the
events that gave rise to the securities laws and the reasons for their current
scope and mandatory nature.
1. Objectives, Scope, and Structure of the Securities Laws
a. History and Purpose of Securities Regulation
The problems that the securities laws address are not new. These prob-
lems are as timeless as the avarice of sellers and the gullibility of buyers." In
fact, the genesis of our modem securities laws dates back centuries. 5 Law-
makers in the United States initially enacted the securities laws to eliminate
some of the serious abuses found in unregulated capital markets. 6 As with
most regulatory regimes, legislators promulgated the securities laws to protect
citizens from harm caused by the actions of others. 7
The first state securities laws were adopted in Kansas in 1911 . At that
time, Kansas was overrun with individuals promoting fraudulent enterprises.
The fraud became so blatant that it was said promoters "would sell building
lots in the blue sky in fee simple."89 The earliest securities legislation was
designed to protect individuals from these unscrupulous promoters. By 1929
most states had some form of securities regulation to safeguard their citizens
from such dishonest and unethical schemes.90
crossroads." McGarity noted that "[tihe primary significance of... the continuing debate over
the role of regulation in society has been to reopen previously settled questions and to revive
positions that have remained virtually dormant since theNew Deal." McGarity, supra note 36,
at 1463.
84. See Louis Loss, FUNDAmENTALS OF SECuRmEs REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1988) ("For
the problems at which modem securities regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity of
sellers and the gullibility of buyers.").
85. See id. at 1-3 (tracing origins of securities laws back to English legislation adopted
in 1285 to license brokers and to prohibit unfair sales practices).
86. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
87. Cf McGarity, supra note 36, at 1464 (discussing impetus behind most federal regu-
latory programs).
88. See Jeffrey T. Haughey & KevinM. Veler, Empirical Research Project, Blue SkyLaws
andState Takeover Statutes: New Importancefor an OldBattleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 691
(1982).
89. See id at 691 n.3 (citing Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CANADiAN L. TIMES 37, 37
(1916)). These unscrupulous promoters became known as "blue sky merchants," and the state
securities legislation enacted to counter such fraud became known as "Blue Sky Law." See id
90. See id. at 697.
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Federal involvement in securities regulation began in response to the
stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s91 with the adop-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)' and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).93 Investigations of the financial markets
duringthat period revealed widespread fraud, manipulation, and victimization
of investors.94
From the beginning, the central focus of the federal regulatory structure
has been disclosure.' The goal has been to protect investors by prohibiting
fraudulent and manipulative practices and by requiring disclosure of informa-
tion material to investment decisions so as to provide investors and the mar-
ketplace with sufficient information to make informed investment decisions.96
As the Supreme Court noted, a fundamental purpose of the securities laws is
"to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry.
9 7
The policies that the securities laws have been said to promote include
such socially-directed objectives as the protection of investors, the elimination
of manipulative and deceptive practices, the promotion of full disclosure, the
encouragement of high ethical standards, and the provision of effective
sanctions for violation.98 More simply stated, Americans traditionally abhor
91. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Some
legal scholars, such as Judge Richard Posner, contend that the securities laws are based on
misconceptions about the 1929 market crash and the depression. Posner suggests that the 1929
stock market crash was not the result of fraud, speculation, and other abuses as commonly
believed, but instead simply a response to an anticipated decline in economic activity. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMlC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.8, at 444 (4th ed. 1992).
92. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. 1 1996). The Securi-
ties Act deals with initial distributions of securities. See id.
93. SecuritiesExchangeActof 1934,15U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm(1994&Supp. 111996). The
Exchange Act primarily concerns trading in and regulation of secondary markets. See id. § 78b.
94. See, e.g., STOCK EXCHANGEPRACTICES, S. REP.NO. 73-1455, at 1 (1934), reprinted
in II FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITTEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1933-1982, at 1257 (1983).
95. See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977).
96. See Randallv. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647,648-49 (1986); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
97. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933), quoted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953)).
98. See, e.g., Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 ("One of[theExchange Act's] central purposes
is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure... ."); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("[A]mong [the Exchange Act's] chief purposes is 'the protection of
investors,' which certainly implies the availability ofjudicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result."); Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186 ("A fundamental purpose, common to the [securi-
ties laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
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those who do not play by the rules.99 The securities laws are intended to
foster fair play and insure the integrity of the markets."° As Judge Charles
Clark noted in a much cited passage, "The essential objective of securities
legislation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from the
overreachings of those who do.'
"0 '
b. Scope of the Securities Laws
To achieve its goal of investor protection, Congress broadly drew the
scope of the securities laws. Congress intentionally defined the word "secu-
rity" in general terms to include within its definition the many types of instru-
ments that fall within the ordinary understanding of what constitutes a secu-
rity. 2 The statutory definition, therefore, includes well-known investment
vehicles, such as stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures.0 3 But recognizing the
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry."); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ("[The whole statute discloses a
broad purpose to regulate securities transactions of all kinds and, as part of such regula-
tion .... the elimination of all manipulative or deceptive methods in such transactions .... ).
99. See ABA Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, Regulation Under theAntifraudProvisions ofthe Securities Exchange
Act of1934, reprinted in III SECURITiES LAWADMINISTRATION, LMGATION, AND ENFORCEMENT
215, 220 (Franklin E. Gill ed., Section of Business Law American Bar Association 1991).
100. See id. Section 2 of the Exchange Act expressly sets forth the legislative purpose and
perceived need for securities regulation. Section 2, in part, states:
[Transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes
it necessary to provide regulation and control of such transactions and of practices
and matters related thereto ... in order to protect interstate commerce, the national
credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance offair
and honest markets in such transactions ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994) (emphasis added).
101. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
102. See FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECUR1TIES IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933), reprinted in I FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
SECURITIES LAW COMMITrEE, FEDERAL SECURrrIEs LAWS, LEGISLATIVEHISTORY, 1933-1982,
at 138, 148 (1983).
103. Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act defines a "security" as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating
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boundlessness of human ingenuity, Congress also included descriptive
phrases, such as "investment contract" and "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security,"""' which are expansive enough to encompass
essentially any instrument that might be sold as an investment.105 Courts have
construed these general terms broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of
the legislation and to afford investors the full protection of the laws." 6 In
addition, by focusing on the substance of each transaction, rather than its
form, and by emphasizing economic reality, courts have been able to expand
the scope of the securities laws. 7 As a result, the securities laws have been
able to reach many novel, uncommon, and irregular devices.0
to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 111996).
While there are some minor differences, the basic definition of a "security" in the
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and under most state securities laws is virtually the same.
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act defines a security in substantially the same manner as the
Securities Act except (i) it does not contain a reference to "evidence of indebtedness," (ii) it
excludes from the definition short-term "commercial paper," and (iii) it uses a slightly different
approach to classify oil and gas interests. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994), with 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court stated that the definition of "security" will be treated as identical for purposes
of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471
U.S. 681,686 n.1 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,847 n. 12 (1975);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967).
In addition, most jurisdictions have adopted definitions of the term "security" modeled
after the definition in the Securities Act. Thirty-fivejurisdictions have adopted securities acts
based on the 1956 version of the Uniform Securities Act, which was amended in 1958. See
UNIF. SEC. ACT (1956) (amended 1958), 713 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 1998). Nine jurisdictions have
adopted securities acts based on the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act, which was
amended in 1988. See UNIF. SEC. ACT (1985) (amended 1988), 713 U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 1998).
The definitions of the term "security" in these Uniform Securities Acts were deliberately
modeled after the definition in § 2(1) of the Federal Securities Act. See UNIF. SEC. ACT (1956)
§ 401(1) (amended 1958), 7B U.L.A. 583 cmt. 1(1985); UNIF. SEC.ACT (1985) §101 (amended
1988), 7B U.L.A. 153 cmt. 17 (Supp. 1998). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1), with UNIF. SEC.
ACT (1985) § 101(16) (amended 1988), 7B U.L.A. 150 (Supp. 1998), and UNIF. SEC. ACT
(1956) § 401(1) (amended 1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985).
104. See supra note 103. These general catch-all phrases are not defined in the federal
securities acts or the Uniform Securities Acts. As a result, the courts have been left to define
these terms.
105. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990).
106. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
107. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
108. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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The most commonly applied descriptive phrase is the term "invest-
ment contract." Courts have held that the phrase embraces all arrangements
when one invests money in a common enterprise with the expectation of
receiving a return primarily based on the efforts of others. l° Courts have used
the investment contract test to reach a wide variety of instruments, from
interests in conventional investment vehicles (like limited partnerships,"'
franchises,"' and certain general partnerships" 2) to more unusual investment
opportunities (such as schemes involving fruit trees, chinchillas, self-improve-
ment courses, and cemetery lots"'). With the recent proliferation in new
forms of business associations,"' the investment contract test has become
increasingly important."5 For over fifty years, this broad definition of the
term "security," coupled with the judicially-created investment contract test,
has proven extremely flexible, adaptable, and capable of protecting investors
109. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
110. See, e.g., Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1983); Goodman
v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-09 (7th Cir. 1978).
111. Courts have held that conventional franchising agreements generally do not constitute
securities under the investment contract test if the franchisee exerts meaningful efforts. If the
franchisee has not been granted realistic authority to exercise significant managerial rights and
responsibilities, courts have held an investment contract exists and the interests constitute
securities. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1982).
112. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,417-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing circum-
stances under which joint venture and general partnership interests may be found to be invest-
ment contracts and hence securities).
113. For citations to cases holding that investments in fruit trees, chinchillas, self-improve-
ment courses, and cemetery lots were investment contracts and therefore securities, see 1
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEcuRrrEs REGULATION § 1.5 (3d ed. 1995).
114. Recently, there has been an explosion ofnew business organization forms and numer-
ous variations of each form. For example, organizers of a small business can choose from over
ten different entity forms: a general partnership, a limited liability partnership, a limited part-
nership, a limited liability limited partnership, a limited liability company, a limited partnership
association, a corporation taxed undersubsection C ofthe Internal Revenue Code, a corporation
taxed under subsection S of the Internal Revenue Code, a professional corporation, a coopera-
tive, or a statutory business trust. See Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a Name?:
An Argument for a Small Business "Limited Liability Entity" Statute (With Three Subsets of
Default Rules), 32 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 101, 101-02 (1997).
115. As lawmakers create new forms of business organization and variations emerge,
scholars, courts, and practitioners generally apply the investment contract test to determine
whether an interest in the new entity constitutes a security. Cf. ALAN 1L BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERsHIPs AND THE REvisED
UNIFORM PARTNERsHIP AcT § 7.01 (1997) (discussing application of investment contract test
to determine if limited liability partnership interests constitute securities); Elaine A. Welle,
Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities: An Analysis of Federal and State Actions
AgainstLimitedLiability Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 425,441-
65 (1996) (discussing application of investment contract test to determine if limited liability
company interests constitute securities).
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despite the many challenges presented by ever-changing business environ-
ments.
c. Mandatory Nature of Securities Regulation
To prevent overreaching and manipulation by sellers, Congress afforded
investors special protections and expressly prohibited waiver of these protec-
tions.' 6 The securities laws, therefore, are mandatory in nature. Ifatransac-
tion involves the offer or sale of a "security," the transaction is subject to the
securities laws and investors are granted special protections. For example, the
antifraud provisions"' apply to every sale of a "security.""
8
Congress also feared that sellers might attempt to maneuver buyers into
waiving their rights under the securities laws. To counterbalance the often
superior bargaining power of sellers and to insure that investors maintain an
equal footing with sellers, Congress included explicit antiwaiver provisions
in the securities laws." 9 Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
prohibit individuals from waiving their rights under the securities laws. These
provisions void any condition, stipulation, or provision waiving compliance
with the securities laws. 20 As a result, a purchaser of a security could not, for
116. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,432,435,438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
117. The antifraud provisions barmaterial omissions and misrepresentations in connection
with the sale of a security. The antifraud provisions are found in the Securities Act of 1933 §§
12(a)(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(a)(2), 77q(a) (1994 & Supp. 111996), and the Securities
ExchangeActof 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994);see also UNIF. SEC.ACT(1985) § 501
(amended 1988), 7B U.L.A. 188 (Supp. 1998); UNF. SEC.ACT(1956) § 101 (amended 1958),
7B U.L.A. 516 (1985).
118. The authors of a leading casebook on securities regulation observed:
Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act provide certain specific exemptions from
the broad registration and prospectus requirements of § 5, although the antifraud
provisions of both the [Securities Act] and [Exchange Act] remain applicable.
Read literally, section 3 seems to exempt the securities themselves from the opera-
tion of the Act, unless the Act elsewhere provides otherwise. On the other hand,
the various clauses of § 4 clearly are transaction exemptions, rather than securities
exemptions.
See RICHARD W. JENNiNos ET AL., SEcuRrrEs REGuLAniON: CAsEs AND MATERIALs 317 (7th
ed. 1992).
119. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 253 n.9 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994) ("Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994) ("Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."); see also
UNIF. SEC. ACT (1985) § 802(b) (amended 1988), 7B U.L.A. 208 (Supp. 1998) ("A provision
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example, agree to waive his right to bring an action for violation of the
antifraud provisions, if material omissions or misrepresentations were made
in connection with the sale of the security. Thus, the protections of the
securities laws are mandatory and not waivable by investors.
2. Reform Initiatives Present a Choice of Values
With this background, it is clear that the reform initiatives calling for
selective securities law deregulation present a choice of values. Congress
enacted the securities laws to promote socially-directed values, such as
fairness, equity, the protection of investors, the deterrence of fraud, and the
promotion of ethical standards.12' Proponents of the reform measures advo-
cate selective deregulation and the elimination of certain mandatory con-
straints to promote conservative values, such as freedom of contract and
private ordering." The debate, therefore, reflects the tension between indi-
vidualism and the more socially-directed concerns of modem communitar-
ians.'" As such, this controversy parallels similar debates in politics, philoso-
phy, sociology, and economics. Essentially, the debate turns on one's view
of the appropriate degree of regulation which in turn depends on one's view
of the values to be served by regulation.
McGinty, Ribstein, and other proponents of the law and economics
movement believe that the primary role of regulation is to facilitate contract-
ing, reduce costs, and enhance economic efficiency." s They prefer private
decision-making through individualized market transactions over conventional
government regulation. Government intervention in the market is generally
disfavored, although they are willing to recognize a limited role for govern-
ment in enforcing contracts, protecting private property, and addressing
market imperfections. Advocates of this approach urge the use of cost-benefit
analysis to assess the desirability of any regulation.
in a contract entered into or effective in this State, binding a person acquiring a security to
waive compliance with this [Act] or a rule or order of the [Administrator] under this [Act] is
nonenforceable.").
121. See discussion supra Part IV.A.I.a.
122. See discussion supra Part III.
123. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (characterizing substantive dichotomy as individualism and
altruism).
124. Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALl Principles of
Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 872, 879-80 & n.42 (1993) (observing
that contemporary corporate law debate over mandatory versus enabling rules parallels similar
debates in other disciplines and citing numerous authority in such fields).
125. See McGarity, supra note 36, at 1484-98 (describing reform positions that McGarity
characterizes as "anti-interventionists" and "free marketeers").
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Others view government regulation as a means to advance the public
good, promote social discourse, and foster collective interests.'26 They believe
that government intervention is justified on fairness, equity, or other grounds
apart from repairing broken markets. Proponents of a more communitarian
approach contend that regulation should reflect good public policy, beyond
simple utilitarianism and allocative efficiency. Regulation should protect
citizens from the adverse consequences of profit-maximizing activities, rather
than deify individual preferences. They maintain that the law can and should
shape human preferences, not merely reflect them.
The controversy, thus, centers on the goals to be achieved through regula-
tion.27 If the purpose of regulation is simply to facilitate contracting, reduce
costs, and enhance efficiency, then possibly the contractarian proposals to
allow parties to opt out of the securities laws should be adopted. If, on the
other hand, the purpose of securities regulation is to serve a more publicly-
directed purpose, such as increasing public confidence in capital markets,
deterring fraud, or protecting investors, then the reform measures would be
improvident.
Proponents of selective deregulation, such as McGinty and Ribstein,
would have us believe that these reform measures simply present a choice
between costly, vague tests and efficient, bright-line rules. These reform
initiatives, however, have much broader implications. The debate involves
more than a choice between standards and rules - it involves a choice of
values. The securities laws have social, as well as economic, consequences.""
Laws and regulations are symbolic. Laws can reveal and reshape our commu-
nal attitudes and values. 9 Laws establish standards and define ethical
behavior. The securities laws, therefore, have a public dimension that must
be considered before adopting these reform proposals.
By prohibiting fraud and mandating disclosure, the securities laws protect
investors and promote honesty, trust, and ethical behavior in commercial
126. See id. at 1498-1527 (describing reform positions that McGarity characterizes as
"modem mugwumps," "good government reinventionists," and "unrepentant protectionists").
127. Cf Mitchell, supra note 124, at 879 (noting thatdebate overAmerican Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance turns on values to be served by regulation and contrasting
contractarian values of enhanced efficiency with more publicly-directed purposes).
128. Cf Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We TalkAbout FiduciaryDuty? Directors'
Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 954, 955, 968-69 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary law serves to provide "a sys-
tem of moral education that promotes and reinforces trust and honesty in commercial transac-
tions").
129. See CAssR. SuNSTEiN,FREEMARKETSAND SOcIALJUSTICE7 (1997) (discussinghow
law shapes preferences); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Eco-
nomic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 595 (1985) (discussing how legal decisions define
and reshape values).
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transactions.13 The securities laws set standards that serve to socialize, to
educate, and to direct individuals toward more morally appropriate forms of
behavior. The antiwaiver provisions and the mandatory nature of the securi-
ties laws... send a strong signal that certain behavior will not be tolerated in
any transaction involving a security. Untrue statements of material facts,
omissions of material information, and any act or practice that constitutes
fraud or deceit are prohibited in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 132 The securities laws, thereby, promote specific values and pressure
parties to behave in a selfless fashion.
Permitting parties to opt out of the securities laws would undercut this
message. Selective deregulation would signal that economic efficiency,
individual cost considerations, and personal preferences are more important
than social consequences. It would suggest that maximizing economic effi-
ciency effectively trumps all other values in public policy-making. Symboli-
cally, such reforms would make a powerfully negative statement about soci-
ety's concern for investor protection and ethical standards. Permitting parties
to opt out would undermine the socializing and educational value of the
securities laws. The same standards would no longer apply to all securities
transactions.' Such reforms would signify that ethical and behavioral
standards are negotiable. Opting out would send the message that legal
constraints are optional - unnecessary obstructions that can be contracted
around with the assistance of skillful and well-paid lawyers.3 4 These reform
measures suggest that laws should be viewed as a menu that one should be
able to simply opt out of on the basis of economic considerations, when the
costs and burdens are individually viewed as too great. Selective deregulation
elevates personal preferences and economic considerations, but ignores the
130. See supra Part IV.A.1.a (discussing purposes of securities regulation).
131. See supra Part IV.A.l.c (discussing antiwaiver provisions and mandatory nature of
securities laws).
132. See supra note 117.
133. If McGinty's or Ribstein's opting-out proposals were adopted, certain investment
transactions would be free from securities regulation. For example, under McGinty's proposal,
passive investors in limited liability companies would be permitted to opt out of securities law
coverage. See supra Part IH.A. Neither the disclosure requirements nor the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws would apply to such transactions. As a result, passive investments
in stock and limited partnership interests would be subject to the securities laws, but passive
investments in limited liability company interests would be free from securities regulation.
Different standards and regulations would apply depending on the form of the transaction.
134. For instance, once courts began presuming that general partnership interests were not
securities, unscrupulous promoters began hiring savvy transactional lawyers to structure their
transactions as general partnerships. See infra note 235. If McGinty's or Ribstein's opting-out
proposals were adopted, sophisticated promoters who could afford costly legal advice would
structure their transactions, when feasible, to avoid securities regulation.
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extralegal and moral implications of the securities laws. Is this the message
that we, as a society, wish to send?
3. Opting-Out Proposals Undermine a Coherent Theoretical Framework
Opting-out initiatives in the securities regulation context are also philo-
sophically inconsistent with the underlying tenets of the securities laws - its
mandatory nature'35 and its policy of full disclosure. 36 Selective deregula-
tion measures offer only limited, piecemeal solutions to perceived problems
with the securities laws. 37 Adoption of such proposals would undermine the
coherent, consistent, dominant, and underlying philosophy of the securities
laws. The proponents of selective deregulation are asking us to incorporate
contractarian principles, such as opting out and waiver, into a securities law
whose hallmark has been its mandatory nature. They are asking us to amend a
securities law premised on a philosophy of full disclosure to create exceptions
where the philosophy of caveat emptor"' would reign.'39 Reforms based on
philosophically incompatible positions would weaken the basic theoretical
framework of the securities laws by sending mixed normative messages.4
These reform measures cannot be evaluated in isolation. Such reforms clearly
conflict with the central principles of the securities laws; therefore, their adop-
tion would undermine the basic theoretical framework of the securities laws.
135. See supra Part IV.A.I.c.
136. See supra Part IV.A.I.a.
137. The proposed reforms are piecemeal in that they are limited and scatter-shot in nature.
McGinty advocates selective deregulation by entity type. See supra Part III.A. Ribstein
advocates selective deregulation by entity type and contractual waiver. See supra Part III.B.
Under these proposals, only certain transactions would be exempt from securities regulation.
The proposals do not affect all transactions. The proposals, therefore, are piecemeal, rather than
global, in nature.
138. "Caveat emptor" is a Latin term for "letthe buyerbeware." WEBsTER'sNEw WORLD
DICTIONARY 96 (1995).
139. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[a] fundamental purpose, common to [the securities laws],
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus
to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Id. at 186. Both
McGinty's and Ribstein's proposals would result in certain transactions being exempt from
securities regulation, meaning exempt from both the disclosure and antifraud requirements.
Without regulation, the philosophy of caveat emptor would govern and the buyer in such trans-
actions would be forced to beware.
140. For example, both contractarians and communitarians have criticized the American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance for failing to adopt a philosophically con-
sistent corporate model. The drafters, in attempting to blend different corporate approaches,
failed to satisfy any constituency. As a result, the Principles have been roundly criticized for
lacking acoherentunderlying philosophy and sending mixed normative messages. See Mitchell,
supra note 124. See generally Symposium, The American Law Institute's Principles of Cor-
porate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871 (1993).
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4. Reform Measures Represent a Misguided Attempt to Extend
Contractual Default Theory
By drawing analogies to contractual default theory and characterizing
securities regulations as default rules, the advocates of selective securities law
deregulation attempt to portray opting-out proposals as simply a logical
extension of the contractarian reform measures that have already had a signifi-
cant impact on corporate law. 4 Rather than representing a logical extension
of contractual default theory, opting-out initiatives in the securities law
context constitute a misapplication of contractual default theory. The propo-
nents of these opting-out initiatives fail to appreciate the distinctions between
default rules and immutable rules. Moreover, treating securities regulations
as default rules would thwart the purposes of the securities laws. In addition,
the over-inclusive nature of these opting-out proposals would grant fraudulent
promoters a license to mislead and invite the unscrupulous to prey upon the
most vulnerable investors.
At first glance, the reform initiatives appear to merely represent an
application of contractual default theory in the securities regulation context.
In contract law, default rules establish contractual rights and obligations when
an agreement is silent with respect to certain topics.'42 Default rules generally
provide supplementary terms when the parties have not agreed otherwise.'43
The parties, however, are free to opt out of these standard default provisions
if they strike a different bargain.'" For example, if a contract by a merchant
for the sale of goods is silent with respect to warranties, a warranty of mer-
chantability is implied. 45 The parties, however, may waive the warranty or
opt for a different provision by express agreement.'46
141. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 369-71 (drawing analogies between experimentation
in deregulating business organizations and permitting limited liability companies to opt out of
securities law coverage). See generally supra Part II (regarding current trend toward private
ordering in corporate law context).
142. The term "default rules" became popular when Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner used it
in their seminal article, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault
Rules, 99 YALEL.J. 87 (1989). Ayres and Gertner noted that default rules also have been called
"background, backstop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformu-
lated, preset, presumptive, standby, standard-form and suppletory rules." Id. at 91 & n.25. For
a small sampling of the literature on contractual default theory, see generally Symposium on
Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 1 (1993).
143. See Steven J. Burton, DefaultPrinciples, Legitimacy, andtheAuthority ofa Contract,
3 S. CAL. INTERD Is. L.J. 115, 116 (1993).
144. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1995) ("The effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement .... ).
145. See id § 2-314(1).
146. See id. §§ 2-314, 2-316.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 519 (1999)
Proponents of opting out in the securities law context appear to be
suggesting that we view securities regulations as default rules that apply only
when the parties to certain transactions have not agreed otherwise. Under
these reform initiatives, parties would be free to opt out of securities regula-
tions by private agreement. McGinty's and Ribstein's proposals, for example,
permit parties to waive all securities regulations, both the disclosure and the
antifraud requirements, with one broad stroke by private agreement, as if such
regulations were only default rules.
147
Nevertheless, even in contract law, default theory is not without con-
straints. The freedom to contract itself is limited. For example, some contracts
are unenforceable on public policy grounds, such as contracts that restrain
trade. 4 1 These contractual constraints often have been cast as immutable rules
applicable to all contracts that may not be varied by private agreement. 149 The
duty to act in good faith, for instance, is an immutable part of every contract. 50
The parties to a contract may not disclaim their obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness, or care. '' Immutable rules frequently set minimum
standards or basic requirements that apply to all contracts. These contractual
constraints are designed to protect parties to the contract'5 2 or parties outside
147. McGinty proposes that investors in limited liability companies be permitted to opt out
of securities law coverage if potential investors are notified that the protections of the securities
laws will not apply. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 371, 375, 437. See generally Part III.A.
Ribstein proposes that parties be allowed to contractually opt out of securities law coverage
through choice of entity or through waiver. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2,
at 810, 812, 827-28, 832; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 5, 7, 26. See generally
Part III.B.
148. See E.ALLANFARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs ch. 5 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995); JOHNE.
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTs § 98 (3d ed. 1990). Public policy grounds that courts
have cited to justify nonenforcement include moral values (policies against impairment of
family relationships and against gambling), economic grounds (policies against restraint oftrade
and restraints on alienation of property), and the need to protect government institutions
(policies against improperly influencing government officials). See FARNSWORTH, supra, § 5.2,
at 351.
149. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (stating that good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and
care may not be disclaimed by agreement); id. § 1-105(2) (limiting party's right to choose
applicable law); id. § 2-718(1) (stating that liquidated damages clauses are allowed only when
amount involved is reasonable); id § 2-719(3) (stating that consequential damages clauses may
not operate in unconscionable manner).
150. See id. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation ofgood
faith in its performance or enforcement.").
151. See id. § 1-102(3) (stating that "obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness
and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement").
152. Several of the nonvariable provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code are intended
to prevent one party from taking undue advantage of another. See, e.g., id. § 1-203 (protecting
against bad faith); id. § 2-302 (protecting against unconscionable contracts).
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the contract15 1 from the socially deleterious effects of unregulated contract-
ing. 54 These rules limit freedom to contract on the grounds that parties
internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves or
others without government intervention.
The securities laws are analogous to immutable rules, not default rules.
As previously discussed, a fundamental purpose of the securities laws is to
protect those who cannot protect themselves.15 Lawmakers promulgated the
securities laws specifically to protect the public from harm caused by others.
Legislators also enacted the securities laws to eliminate some of the serious
abuses found in unregulated capital markets and to restore the integrity of the
market. 56 The securities laws, thus, are intended to protect the parties to the
transaction and to protect the public in general by establishing basic ground
rules that apply to all securities transactions. 57 As such, the securities laws
constitute immutable rules. 58 As immutable rules, the regulations governing
securities transactions should notbe subjectto waiverbyprivate agreement. 59
The reform initiatives, therefore, represent a misapplication of contractual
default theory and may not be justified on such grounds.
153. Several Uniform Commercial Code provisions are designed to protect the interests
of third parties. See, e.g., id. § 2-403(1) (protecting good faith purchasers for value); id. § 2-
702(3) (protecting rights of buyers in ordinary course and other good faith purchasers). Earlier
drafts of Section 1-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code provided that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by this Act the rights and duties of a third party may not be adversely varied by an
agreement to which he is not a party or by which he is not otherwise bound." 1 JAMEs J. WHrE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-11, at 183 (4th ed. 1995). The
subsection, however, was deleted, reportedly because it was deemed unnecessary. See id.
154. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 142, at 88-89; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism
and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.L 763, 763 (1983).
155. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
156. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
157. See generally supra Part IV.A.l.a.
158. Arguably, not all securities regulations constitute immutable rules. A case can be
made that some securities regulations should be treated as merely default rules, such as certain
disclosure requirements. For example, one may argue that parties should be permitted to opt
out of specific written disclosure requirements by private agreement McGinty's and Ribstein's
proposals, however, would permit parties to certain transactions to opt out of all securities
regulations, both the antifraud provisions and the disclosure requirements. With one election,
the parties would be allowed to not only opt out of regulations analogous to default rules (such
as the disclosure requirements), but also would be allowed to opt out of securities regulations
analogous to immutable rules (such as the antifraud provisions) as well. In this author's view,
such a broad and over-inclusive election would undermine public policy and run counter to the
intent of the securities laws.
159. Congress recognized the need for mandatory constraints in securities transactions and
adopted the antiwaiver provisions that expressly forbid waiver to protect one party from taking
undue advantage of another. See supra Part IV.A. I.c.
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Moreover, default rules are not designed to protect parties internal or
external to the contract from harm. Default rules, for example, are not suited
to protecting against fraud. 6 Default rules enacted to prevent fraud are not
likely to achieve their purposes because unscrupulous promoters are the most
likely to include waiver provisions in their agreements and those individuals
that the rules are designed to protect are the most likely candidates to be
duped into waiving such protections. Consequently, treating securities laws
that prohibit fraud as default rules would undoubtedly fail to achieve the
desired results.
The over-inclusive nature of the opting-out elections proposed by Mc-
Ginty and Ribstein also offer unscrupulous promoters an opportunity to mis-
lead investors. The reform initiatives would permit parties to opt out of all
securities regulations, both the antifraud provisions and the disclosure require-
ments. It is in an investor's interest to demand honesty.'6 Most investors
would probably want promoters to warrant that their representations are
truthful. The antifraud provisions of the securities laws provide investors with
such assurances. But an overly broad election option allows fraudulent
promoters to persuade investors that by opting out of the securities laws and
its disclosure requirements the enterprise will save unnecessary expenses and
thereby produce increased profits. Most investors will never realize that they
are waiving the antifraud requirements as well. The over-inclusive nature of
the election grants fraudulent promoters a license to mislead and invites the
unprincipled to prey upon the most vulnerable investors.
5. Common Law Remedies Are Inadequate
The advocates of selective securities law deregulation assume that the
common law provides adequate protection against fraud. 62 Nevertheless,
160. Russell Korobkin noted in his article, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default
Rules, 83 CORNELL L, REv. 608 (1998):
Default rules, by their nature, are not instruments well-suited to protecting third-parties
from deleterious effects of contracts, or to protecting the parties from each other. For
example, it would make little sense for lawmakers to enact default rules prohibiting
fraud in contract negotiations in order to protect contracting parties, or prohibiting
contracts for illegal services in order to protect nonparties, rather than enacting sub-
stantively identical mandatory, or "immutable," rules which private parties are not free
to change. Default rules enacted for such purposes would likely fail to achieve their
desired purpose and instead, would merely increase transaction costs.
Id at 610-11 (footnote omitted).
161. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market,
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 949, 952 (1991).
162. See McGinty, supra note 2, at438 (stating that"common-law rules provide significant
substantive protections"); Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 33 (stating that "the anti-
fraud rules do not vary substantively from state common law fraud protection").
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history teaches us that the common law failed to supply sufficient safeguards
against the abuses found in unregulated capital markets. 63 Congress enacted
the federal securities laws after extensive investigative hearings and upon
finding that "the common law and state legislation afforded the public insuffi-
cient protection against plain fraud both in the issuance of securities and in
postissuance trading.""' State and federal securities laws were, in large part,
a response to the perceived inadequacies of the common law.165 The federal
securities laws, for example, were intended to broaden the protections granted
investors under the common law.'6 Courts have stated repeatedly that the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not limited to situations that
would give rise to a common law cause of action. 67 Since the 1930s, legisla-
tors, courts, and governing administrative agencies have expanded the
protections of the securities laws well beyond traditional common law fraud
cases.
169
The common law has not been, and in the near future is not likely to be,
an adequate substitute for statutory protection. The federal securities laws,
coupled with the Uniform Securities Acts, provide a national standard - a
benchmark that promotes uniformity. 69 The common law, on the other hand,
163. See supra Part IV.A.I.a.
164. Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities
Fraud, and Rule l0b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 58 n.266 (1998) (quoting I LOUIS Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECuRrrI REGULATION 27-28 (3d ed. 1989)); see also Joel Seligman, The Histor-
ical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (1983) ("IT]he
mandatory corporate disclosure system was adopted because of the widely held belief that
securities fraud was prevalent and that state laws often could do little to prevent or punish it.").
165. See Herman& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,389 (1983) ("[A]n important
purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections by establishing higher standards ofconduct in the securities industry.").
166. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,244 n.22 (1988) ("Actions under Rule
lOb-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims... and are in part
designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law ...." (citation
omitted)); Bateman Eichler v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (stating that United States
Supreme Court has "eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws").
167. See 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIS REGULATION 3429 & n.79 (3d ed.
1991) (citing numerous cases in support of proposition that antifraud provisions of securities
laws are not limited to situations that would give rise to common law causes of action).
168. See Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the
Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 729-30 (1997) (discussing how courts and Securities and
Exchange Commission have expanded protections of securities laws beyond paradigmatic fraud
case by citing examples such as extending protections to investors in secondary market and
creating liability for insider trading).
169. When adopting the federal securities acts, Congress specifically preserved the state
securities laws rather than preempting the field. See LOUIS LOSS &EDWARD M. CowErr, BLUE
SKY LAW 237-38 & n.1 (1958). This action resulted in a dual system of federal and state
regulation. To minimize the diversity in state laws and to promote uniformity, the vast majority
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is far from uniform. Common law actions for fraud overlap with various other
common law theories and remedies, such as deceit, misrepresentation, breach
of warranty, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission."' The
common law also varies from state to state, varies over time, and varies in
equity. Even within a jurisdiction, a common law rule will tend to be more
elastic than a rule based on statutory interpretation."' Under a common law
regime, courts may expand current theories and develop new theories to
redress perceived wrongs. Such variations and elasticity create uncertainty
and risks that increase the cost of raising capital." Under a common law
regime, it would be difficult for firms and investors to predict what the law
requires. Parties will not know until long after the fact whether they have
ofjurisdictions have adopted, in whole or in part, securities laws based on the Uniform Securi-
ties Acts. See UNIF. SEC. ACT (1956) (amended 1958), 713 U.L.A. 211 (Supp. 1998) (adopted
by 35 jurisdictions); UNWF. SEC. ACr (1985) (amended 1988), 7B U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 1998)
(adopted by ninejurisdictions). The Uniform Securities Acts were intended to coordinate state
and federal legislation, as well as provide consistency from state to state. See Loss & COWETr,
supra, at 237-38. The drafters of the Uniform Securities Acts, whenever feasible, used phrases
that had acquired fixed meanings from having been construed by courts and administrators. See
id. at 237. In drafting the Uniform Securities Acts, they borrowed heavily from federal legis-
lation. Much of the terminology and many ofthe concepts are drawn from the federal securities
laws. For example, the antifraud provisions of the Uniform Securities Acts are substantially
identical to Federal Rule 1Ob-5. See UNW. SEC. AcT (1956) § 101 (amended 1958), 7B U.L.A.
516 cmt. (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT (1985) § 501 (amended 1988), 713 U.L.A. 188 cmt. 1 (Supp.
1998). The definition of the term "security" in the Uniform Securities Acts was deliberately
modeled after the definition of a "security" in the Federal Securities Act. See supra note 103.
Given the similarity in concepts, terminology, and definitions, many state courts have held that
federal case law interpreting statutory provisions that parallel state securities laws are highly
persuasive and therefore such federal precedent is often followed. See, e.g., State v. Gunnison,
618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Ariz. 1980); People v. Milne, 690 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1984). Because
many of the concepts and terminology in the Uniform Securities Acts are drawn from the federal
securities laws and mostjurisdictions have adopted versions of the Uniform Securities Acts, the
federal securities laws provide a standard and promote uniformity.
170. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwis D. LOWENFELs, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON
SEcuRrEsFRADANDCOMMODTIESFRAUD § 2.7(1) (Sept 1997); 9Loss& SELIGMAN, supra
note 167, at 4123 ("The remedies at common law and in equity are breach of warranty, rescis-
sion.., and the tort action of deceit.").
171. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL TL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRuCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 302 (1991).
172. See id.
173. Proponents of opting out will no doubt counter that parties are currently permitted to
opt out of securities law coverage by forming general partnerships that are not considered
"securities" and hence are not governed by the securities laws. Investors in general partnerships,
therefore, have long relied on the common law for protection against fraudulent conduct. As
a result, courts have developed a well-established and predictable body of common law to
address such situations.
The environment that these opting out proposals will create, however, is distinguishable
from the environment created by narrow exceptions for certain general partnership interests.
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violated the law. As a result, some firms may incur significant expenses to
reduce their potential exposure, such as overdisclosing, seeking the advice of
counsel or taking costly precautions, that may prove unnecessary in retrospect.
The uncertainty may also encourage disappointed investors to litigate. In this
new environment, the likelihood of success in litigation would be more
difficult to assess and therefore settlements would be harder to reach. Statu-
tory rules, such as federal and state securities laws, reduce such risks, increase
certainty, and promote uniformity, thereby lessening the aggregate costs of
enforcement and compliance.
It is ironic that the advocates of selective securities law deregulation,
who base their arguments on economic efficiency and reduced transaction
costs, are willing to trade a statutory structure that at least provides some
measure of certainty and predictability for an unpredictable and potentially
widely variable common law regime. The proponents of opting out criticize
what they consider the unpredictability of securities law coverage arguing that
arbitrary judicial interpretation of the definition of a "security" increases both
the risks and costs for businesses. 74 Their dissatisfaction with judicial inter-
pretation of a definition does not support returning to a common law regime
that would result in a hodgepodge of state laws that could wreak greater
havoc. It is curious that at a time when uniformity is viewed as a goal of
paramount importance, 75 the proponents of opting out wish to return to a
The opting out proposals are not supported by the same rationale nor do they provide the same
safeguards. While courts have held that certain general partnership interests are exempt from
securities law coverage, the exemption applies only if the investors in the general partnership
are not in need of the protections provided by the securities laws - meaning when the investors
are capable of protecting their own interests. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 417-25
(5th Cir. 1981) (discussing when general partnership interests constitute securities). Interests
in general partnerships are exempt from securities law coverage only if the investors are
sophisticated, experienced, and knowledgeable business people, who are active participants in
the venture, who do not rely solely on the efforts of others, who retain substantial and meaning-
ful managerial control over the enterprise, and who are capable of intelligently exercising their
partnership powers. See id The proposed selective securities law deregulation measures place
no such restrictions on investors who wish to opt out of securities regulation. Under the reform
measures, there is no requirement that the investors who waive securities law coverage be
capable of protecting themselves.
The body of common law that developed to protect sophisticated investors in general
partnership ventures did not have to address fraudulent schemes involving unsophisticated,
unknowledgeable, and powerless investors. As unscrupulous promoters begin to prey on these
disadvantaged investors, courts will need to develop a new body of common law to address
these situations and remedy perceived wrongs. Whereas unsophisticated investors could rely
on the safety net of the securities laws to protect their interests, if opting out measures are
adopted, courts must develop a new body of common law to redress any wrongs.
174. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 423, 436.
175. Congress passed the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, in part,
to promote uniformity and reduce duplicative state regulation. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
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system governed by a crazy-quilt of common law. Rather than proposing
reform measures that would jettison the securities laws, we should be encour-
aging efforts aimed at coordination and cooperation that would reduce regula-
tory burdens by lessening duplication, variations, and costs.'76
Harry Schulman noted shortly after enactment of the Securities Act that,
after certain policy questions are answered, "there is little in the civil liability
provisions which, in a less scientific and less systematic manner, could not or
would not have been quietly developed over a period of years by courts on the
basis of their own common-law precedents."1" So why, at this point in our
history, should we trade a sophisticated, well-established body of securities
law for the confusion, complexities, and uncertainties of a common law that
over a period of time may well yield the same substantive law?
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court has rendered a number of
restrictive decisions under the federal securities laws that have reduced the
level of investor protection, particularly in nonpublic offerings. 8 These
rulings, however, do not mean that the securities laws should be discarded as
no longer useful. 79 This is akin to throwing the baby out with the bath water.
First, there continues to be situations where the federal securities laws provide
advantages over state securities laws or common law actions. 8 Second, the
note 167, at 60-61. The related conference report stressed the need for state and federal coor-
dination. Seeid. This theme is echoed in much ofthe recent academic and political discussions
concerning securities law reform. A return to common-law remedies based on state law runs
counter to the current movement calling for national uniformity in securities regulation.
176. See infra Part V.
177. Harry Schulman, CivilLiabilityandtheSecuritiesAct, 43 YALEL.J. 227,253 (1933).
178. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,567-78 (1995) (limiting applicabil-
ity of section 12(2) to purchasers of securities acquired in public offering by issuer or its
controlling shareholders); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994)
(holding that section 10(b) of Exchange Act does not provide for aiding and abetting liability
in private actions); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petitrow v. Gibertson, 501 U.S. 350,361-
64 (1991) (determining applicable statute of limitations for private actions under section 10(b)
of Exchange Act).
179. McGinty contends that the dramatic reduction in federal securities law protections
against fraud for investors in nonpublic offerings justifies his call for permitting investors in
limited liability companies to opt out of securities law coverage. Specifically, he argues that
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Gustafson that restricted section 12(2) liability to
public offerings, coupled with the Blue Chip Stamps, Ernst & Ernst, Santa Fe Industries, and
Central Bank decisions that increased the plaintiff's burden for showing Rule lOb-5 liability,
have significantly diminished the advantages of the federal securities laws over state common-
law claims. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 423, 425.
180. Marc Steinberg offers examples of several situations in which plaintiffs may benefit
from pursuing federal, rather than state law, claims. To illustrate, Steinberg notes a number of
limitations on the availability of class action treatment in state securities law and common-law
fraud cases. In addition, variations in state securities laws, like those in New York, may make
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proposals for selective securities law deregulation would not only allow
parties to opt out of the federal securities laws, but would permit parties to opt
out of state securities law coverage as well.' In some cases, state securities
acts provide broader protection against fraudulent conduct than the federal
securities laws.'82 Some state courts have chosen notto follow Supreme Court
precedent when interpreting their state securities laws or have adopted more
expansive tests which may provide plaintiffs with a cause of action where
such a right might not be found under federal law.'83 Restrictive rulings in the
federal context do not support scrapping all state securities laws and returning
to common law causes of action. Moreover, such state law variations in
interpretation are relatively minor when compared with the hodgepodge of
state rulings that could result with a return to common law.
Finally, there is general consensus in the academic community that fraud
in the securities market is undesirable.'" Fraud erodes investor confidence
and reduces allocative efficiency.' 85 Accurate information is necessary to
insure that investors make optimal choices, to preserve investor confidence,
and to safeguard the integrity of the market. Therefore, the issue is not regula-
tion versus free market. The issue is what type of regulatory structure should
be imposed. The preceding discussion suggests that there is reason to believe
the federal securities laws more attractive for plaintiffs in certain situations. See MARC I. STEIN-
BERG, UNDERSTANDING SEcuRITIEs LAW 229-30 (2d ed. 1996).
181. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 437-38 (recommending that Congress add provision
to federal securities laws to allow investors in limited liability companies to opt out of federal
securities law coverage and then add preemption provision stating that federal and state
securities laws do not apply to any excluded limited liability interest).
182. For example, some state securities laws provide that successful plaintiffs may recover
reasonable attorneys' fees and punitive damages. Many state securities acts contain longer
statute of limitations periods. Some state securities acts provide for damages based on negligent
misrepresentations or omissions made in initial offerings as well as in secondary trading
markets. A number of state statutes also extend liability for aiding and abetting. See
STEINBERG, supra note 180, at 231-33.
183. Some state courts have adopted more expansive tests for defining the term "seller."
Many state courts have held that reliance need not be demonstrated under state securities
statutes, thereby facilitating class certification. In a number of states proving loss causation is
not required. See id. at 233-34.
184. Lynn Stout noted, "When securities scholars get together, they often find they agree
on very little. But there is one thing they do agree on: fraud is very, very bad for securities
markets." Lynn Stout, Type IError, Type lI Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 711,713 (1996); see also Greenfield, supra note 168, at 733-34 (noting
that "[n]o serious movement exists either in politics or in academe calling for the end of
government protection against securities fraud").
185. See Stout, supra note 184, at 713; see also Frank H. Easterbrook&DanielR. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 673-80 (1984)
(discussing value of rules against fraud).
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that a common law regime would be less satisfactory than the current regula-
tory scheme.
6. Is Repudiation of the Securities Laws Warranted?
Advocates of selective securities law deregulation also charge that the
costs of the current regulatory structure may well exceed its benefits. 86 Yet,
no one knows whether the costs of securities regulation outweigh the benefits.
Neither the costs nor the benefits are easily measurable. 7 Scholars have
conducted numerous studies, but such studies have been questioned and criti-
cized.8 ' Neither the critics of mandatory securities regulation nor its support-
ers have been able to validate their respective claims regarding the ineffective-
ness or effectiveness of securities regulation."8 Even advocates of deregula-
tion, such as McGinty, admit that the effectiveness of the securities laws is
subject to debate."9 In the face of such inconclusive findings, is radical alter-
ation ofthe regulatory schemejustified?"9' Certainly the burden of persuasion
186. See McGinty, supra note 2, at423-36 (discussing "whetherthe costs of securities law
coverage outweigh its additional benefits over and above the pre-existing common-law protec-
tions against fraud and deceit"); Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 823-32 (dis-
cussing "whether the benefits of achieving the objectives of the securities laws exceed the
benefits of a clear rule that the securities laws do not apply").
187. See EASTERBROOK & FIscEL, supra note 171, at 309. In their book, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel identify certain costs and
benefits associated with securities regulation. See id. at 310-14. They point out that not only
are the direct and indirect costs and benefits of securities regulation difficult to measure, but the
problem in determining the costs of securities regulation is that "we do not know what things
firms would disclose, and to whom, in the absence of the securities laws." Id at 310. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to determine the incremental costs and benefits associated with securi-
ties regulation because we have no benchmark to use to draw comparisons. See id. at 310-14.
188. See, e.g., id at 311-14; Joel Seligman, The Historical Needfor a Mandatory Corpo-
rate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP. L. 1 (1983); see also McGinty, supra note 2, at 424 n.209
(citing notable critiques of securities regulation and related responses).
189. After reviewing the literature and various empirical studies, Easterbrook and Fischel
stated:
Our principal conclusion is that neither the supporters nor the opponents of the
fraud and disclosure rules have made a very good case .... It is fair to say, we
think, that there is no good evidence that the disclosure rules are beneficial. On the
other hand, there is no good evidence that the rules are (a) harmful, or (b) very
costly.... We are left, for the moment at least, with logical argument rather than
proof. And the logical arguments are themselves inconclusive.... We cannot say
that the existing securities laws are beneficial, but we also are not confident that
their probable replacements would be better.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 185, at 672, 713-15.
190. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 423-24.
191. Easterbrook and Fischel observed, "Rules of law may be beneficial in ways we do not
understand, and if all we can say is that we cannot identify either benefit or detriment from a
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rests with the proponents of change. Such conflicting findings support sus-
taining the status quo, rather than serving as a call for experimentation or
change.
Z Risks Posed by Experimentation
Proponents of selective securities law deregulation attempt to mask the
revolutionary and far-reaching nature of their proposals by characterizing their
reform initiatives as experiments. McGinty, for instance, describes his opting-
out proposal as an experiment in deregulation -just a logical extension of
other experiments in deregulating business organizations.1" McGinty pro-
poses what he terms a limited experiment because under his proposal only
limited liability companies would be permitted to opt out of securities law
coverage. 93 McGinty assumes that the experiment would be the subject of
"massive empirical testing" and suggests that it "could provide ajumping off
point for empirically testing the larger question of whether securities regula-
tion generally.., benefits more than it costs." '194
Nevertheless, even experiments pose substantial risks.'95 McGinty,
himself, acknowledges that if securities law protections are lifted, unscrupu-
lous promoters may prey on innocent victims. " Although McGinty proposes
a sunset provision and urges us to monitor the impact of the legislation,
1 97
such measures would not aid unsophisticated investors victimized by fraudu-
lent promoters during the course of the experiment if the experiment fails. 98
given set of rules, the injunction to leave well enough alone has great force." Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 185, at 714-15.
192. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 370-71, 422. McGinty viewed the limited liability
company form of organization itself as a "major experiment" in deregulation. Id at 370.
193. See id. at 441. McGinty argued that because the limited liability company "is still an
emerging form, the experiment is limited in the number of firms that can opt out of securities
law coverage." Id
194. Id.
195. In his article Whither Socialism, Daniel Farber discussed the risks inherent with
experimental proposals to privatize public schools. Among the possible risks are (i) the
proposal will not work in practice, (ii) the experiment will be difficult, if not impossible, to
monitor, and (iii) the experiment may not be reversible if it fails. Daniel A. Farber, Whither
Socialism, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1996). The arguments presented in this subsection
on experimentation are based, in part, on the general concerns expressed by Farber.
196. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 441. McGinty appears untroubled by the possible
increase in fraud. He noted that "the proper benchmark against which to measure the costs from
the increased fraud is the transaction costs that [limited liability companies] would absorb if
they continue to be subject to the current securities law regime." Id
197. See id
198. McGinty stated that "[n]aturally, if after the trial period Congress (or the states)
resumed regulating excluded [limited liability company] interests under the securities laws, any
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Nor would the experiment necessarily be limited simply because only limited
liability companies would be permitted to opt out of securities law coverage.
We know dishonest promoters are quick to adapt.199 We could expect a surge
in the number of limited liability company offerings.2" Clearly, the limited
liability company would become the organizational form of choice for any
questionable investment endeavor.
Also, if a selective deregulation proposal truly is to be an experiment, we
would need to plan accordingly. McGinty seems to assume that government
agencies or private parties would monitor and empirically test the effects of
the legislation.2"' McGinty fails to outline how such legislation would be
monitored or evaluated. Is the government willing to invest in or capable of
undertaking the task? Should evaluation be left to private parties whose
analyses may be colored by self-interest? Is measurement even feasible?
First, we would be asking the government to undertake a task that it has
performed poorly in the past- monitoring the effect of legislation in a system-
atic way.2"2 Few regulatory reforms are systematically monitored or quantita-
such regulation should operate prospectively." Id. at 441 n.255. Assuming no grandfather
clause or retroactive legislative component, such reregulation would impose a penalty under the
securities laws on promoters for continuing conduct, but would not provide relief for promoters'
past conduct. We have no way to estimate possible losses to investors during the experimental
period. State securities agencies have estimated that telemarketing scams alone are "bilking
people out of anywhere from $30 to $60 million each month," and many of these scams are
being funded by pension and retirement funds. Jim MeTague, Crime Story Reruns: Regulators
Say Cable-TV Investment Scams Are Rampant, BARROWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 15; see Ellen E.
Schultz, IRA Money May Attract Shady Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Cl. As a result,
potential losses may prove quite costly.
199. See, e.g., Electronic Commerce: New Forms of Traditional Fraud Emerging on the
Internet, Study Shows, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 644-45 (May 9, 1997) (discus-
sing Deloitte & Touche study concerning fraudulent schemes on internet).
200. As limited liability company legislation began to sweep the country, several legal
commentators took the position that interests in limited liability companies were not securities.
Fraudulent promoters quickly began packaging their investment products as limited liability
companies in an attempt to avoid the securities laws. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller, New Kind
of Company Attracts Many- Some Legal, Some Not, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at B1; John
R. Emshwiller, SEC Sets Sights on Certain LimitedLiability Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
1994, at B2; McTague, supra note 198, at 15. Federal and state actions under the securities
laws against fraudulent limited liability company promoters helped stem the tide. See Welle,
supra note 115, at 431-39, 495-98, 502-05 (describing federal and state actions against
fraudulent limited liability company offerings). McGinty's experiment in deregulation and
Ribstein's "intermediate ordering approach" would create a new wave of limited liability
company formations.
201. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 441.
202. In the environmental area, for example, critics charge that the government has failed
to monitor the effectiveness of certain environmental legislation. See Daniel A. Farber, Envir-
onmentalProtection as a LearningExperience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791,802-03 (1994). Two
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tively evaluated. 3 Studies often take years to complete."' Analysis is time
consuming and expensive. Such studies are frequently criticized, may yield
contradictory findings, or simply may cause further debate.2"5 Moreover, the
effect of the legislation may be hard to measure accurately." 6 Securities
regulation provides many protections that are not easy to quantify. Also,
when we privatize matters, we make them less visible and more difficult to
monitor, thereby compounding the problem. In addition, by limiting the scope
of deregulation, characterizing the measure as an experiment, and subjecting
the legislation to a sunset provision, the economic impact of the legislation
may be skewed.2"7
leading environmental economists observed that despite the potential importance of some
promising alternative regulatory methods, little effort has been spent evaluating the impact of
these programs. See id. at 802. A leading scholar in administrative law has called for better
monitoring of the effects of legislation, better follow up on specific regulatory measures, and
better systems for assessing data related to such legislation. See id. at 802-03.
203. Although many ofthe recent corporate deregulation initiatives have been quitecontro-
versial, few have been monitored rigorously or had their effects evaluated quantitatively. The
limited liability company and limited liability partnership legislation that swept the country was
not the product of careful assessment of the legislation's economic and social effects in other
jurisdictions, but instead was motivated by brazen state self-interest, primarily fear of losing
revenue to other states. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company:
Evidence ofa Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSEL. REV. 1193,1272
(1995) (noting that in "virtually every state, those responsible for drafting and/or enacting
[limited liability company] legislation cite motives which relate to attracting business and
revenue to the state, or avoiding the loss of such business and revenue to other states"); see also
Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future ofLimited Liability Companies, 12 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y
13, 15 (1995) ("The recent surge of interest in [limited liability companies] raises important
issues concerning ... the responsiveness of state legislatures to interest group politics and
competition for investment capital.").
204. For example, after more than ayear of practice under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated in its report to the
President and Congress that it was "too soon to draw any firm conclusions" about the effects
ofthe legislation, itwas "too early to assess with confidence many important effects," "objective
data that could be used to evaluate the effectiveness ... are still very limited," and more time
was needed. Litigation Reform: SEC Adopts Staff Conclusion No Legislative Changes Now
Needed, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 523-24 (Apr. 18, 1997).
205. To illustrate, the SEC issued a report to the President and Congress detailing its
evaluation of the first year of practice under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. The Uniform Standards Coalition immediately responded, taking issue with the report's
conclusions and citing two other studies in support of the Coalition's position. See id. at 524.
206. See supra Part IV.A.6 (discussing difficulties in assessing effectiveness of securities
regulation); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 171, at 314 (identifying certain
difficulties associated with studying effects of securities legislation).
207. As previously indicated, deregulation may cause a surge in the formations of limited
liability companies, if limited liability companies are the only form of organization deregulated.
See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Selective deregulation proposals could artificially
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What happens if the experiment fails? It may be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to reverse. Constitutional and political constraints limit a legislature's
power to reverse an experiment."8 McGinty implicitly acknowledges possible
retroactivity problems by noting that if Congress resumed regulating limited
liability company interests under the securities laws, "any such regulation
should operate only prospectively.""2 9 But if Congress resumed regulation
solely on a prospective basis,21 defrauded investors could only bring securi-
ties law actions for continuing conduct or future conduct. Defrauded inves-
tors would be precluded from bringing securities law claims for past actions,
even if the experiment proved to be a complete failure that vastly increased
the amount of fraud.
Political barriers also may block re ,ersal of the experiment or make
reversal more difficult. Given the current deregulatory climate and national
political mood, it may prove much easier to deregulate than to reregulate.
Unless the experiment is an abject failure, the decision to deregulate may be
irreversible. Rather than being a benign experiment, the proposed legislation
poses substantial risks, may not yield the benefits promised, may actually
result in harm, and yet may prove irreversible.
B. Advantages of Standards Over Rules
The arguments for and against selective deregulation echo the jurispru-
dential debate over the relative merits of legal forms - rules versus standards.
and inappropriately distort choice of entity decisions. Some promoters may decide to package
their investments as limited liability companies for no other reason than to avoid application of
the securities laws. Promoters may miscalculate the value of deregulation and fail to adopt more
appropriate or more beneficial organizational forms. In addition, ifthe market views the reform
measure as an experiment, the true economic impact of deregulation would not be reflected
accurately in the price of the securities. While market actors routinely consider the possibility
of legal change among the factors and risks assessed in pricing an investment, a sunset provision
indicates a mandatory review and therefore signals an increased probability ofreregulation. The
sunset provision would affect the pricing of the securities. Price adjustments might be very
different if the measure was not characterized as an experiment or subject to a sunset provision.
The sunset provision also could cause people to rush to complete their transactions prior to
possible reregulation in order to avoid application of the securities laws to their initial offering.
The limited nature of the reform measure, the characterization as an experiment, and the sunset
provision may each serve to distort the economic impact of the legislation and undermine the
usefulness of the experiment in analyzing the effects of deregulation.
208. The ex post facto clause, due process, the contract clause, and takings concerns
restrict a legislature's ability to impose retroactive legislation. See JOHN E.NOWAK & RONALD
D.ROTUNDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § § 11.8 to 11.14 (5th ed. 1995) (discussing constitutional
limits on retroactive legislation).
209. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 441 n.255.
210. This assumes no grandfathering provisions or retroactive legislative component.
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The basic thesis of the rules versus standards construct" is that law translates
social policies and political principles into legal directives that decision-
makers apply to specific facts and cases.212 These legal directives take various
forms that can be classified as "rules," as "standards," or as some hybrid
combination. A legal directive is a "rule" when it requires the decisionmaker
to respond in a determinate way to certain facts. A legal directive is a "stan-
dard" when it requires the decisionmaker to directly apply principles or
policies to a particular situation. For example, assume a state legislature
wishes to improve the safety of its highways by prohibiting driving at exces-
sive speeds.2"3 The legislature could adopt a rules-based law that declares it
unlawful to exceed a specified speed. Alternatively, the legislature could
adopt a standards-based law that simply declares it unlawful to drive at
unreasonable speeds. The scholarly debate over rules versus standards
primarily centers on the relative merits of these legal forms and attempts to
identify when decisionmakers should promulgate rules versus standards.21 '
Why adopt a rule over a standard or a standard over a rule? Rules are
said to confine the decisionmaker to the facts at hand and reduce judicial
discretion, thereby increasing consistency and predictability, which decreases
the costs of litigation and allows private parties to order their affairs more
productively.2 5 But rules may also produce errors of over- or under-inclusive-
ness. Standards, on the other hand, are said to decrease the errors of over-
and under-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than
do rules." 6 Standards allow decisionmakers to take into account the totality
of the circumstances, to adapt to changing circumstances, and to treat like
cases alike. Whether rules or standards better promote fairness, equity,
211. Duncan Kennedy generally is credited with popularizing the current distinction
between rules and standards in his seminal article Form and Substance in Private LawAdjudi-
cation, 89 HAv. L. REV. 1685 (1976). For detailed descriptions of the differences between the
two forms and the tradeoffs between the use of rules versus standards, see generally Kennedy,
supra; Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rnv. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Forward The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 22 (1992).
212. This brief synopsis of the rules versus standards dichotomy is drawn from Kathleen
M. Sullivan's succinct summary and excellent analysis of constitutional rules and standards in
her article The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Forward: The Justices ofRules and Standards.
See Sullivan, supra note 211, at 57-62.
213. Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner used this example to illustrate the difference
between rules and standards in their article An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STuD. 257,257 (1974).
214. See supra note 211.
215. See Sullivan, supra note 211, at 58, 62-66.
216. See id at 58-59, 66-69.
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equality, predictability, efficiency, and utility constitutes a central theme of
the debate.
In keeping with their market-conscious and conservative spirit, the
proponents of selective deregulation in the securities law context favor rules
over standards, certainty over flexibility, questions of law over questions of
fact, and individualism over community.217 The core of their argument is that
the flexible definition of the term "security," with vague standards such as the
"investment contract test," results in costly and unpredictable case-by-case
analysis and arbitrary judicial decisions.21 They, therefore, advocate the
adoption of bright-line rules, such as deregulation by entity type or private
agreement, to promote certainty and predictability, which they believe will in
turn reduce adjudication and contracting costs.
2 19
But do bright-line rules, such as opting out by entity type or waiver,
promote fairness, equity, equality, predictability, efficiency, and utility better
than the current regulatory scheme with its flexible definition of the term
"security"? The following sections analyze the arguments for bright-line rules
offered by the proponents of selective deregulation and evaluate them in light
of these policy considerations and the particular problems presented in the
securities regulation context.
1. Fairness, Equity, and Equal Treatment
Advocates of selective deregulation criticize the open-ended definition
of a "security" that is found in federal and state securities laws."2 They argue
that vague tests, such as the investment contract test,"' invite judicial discre-
217. See supra Part III.
218. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 374-75,423, 434-36; Ribstein, Form and Substance,
supra note 2, at 808-11, 824-25, 838.
219. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 374-75,434-38; Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra
note 2, at 824-26, 838.
220. The statutory definition of a "security" sets forth a list of specific instruments that are
considered securities, such as stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures, but also includes a number
of catch-all phrases for instruments that do not fit into conventional categories, such as "invest-
ment contract," "instrument commonly known as a 'security,"' and "certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement." See supra note 103 (providing text of Securities
Act of 1933 section 2(a)(1)). These catch-all phrases are not defined in the securities acts. As
a result, the courts have been left to define these terms. See supra Part IV.A.I.b.
221. In SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946), the United States Supreme
Court established a four-prong test to determine whether an interest is an investment contract.
The Court stated that an investment contract "means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby
a person [1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits
[4] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... " Id. Courts have used the
Howey investment contract test and its case-by-case approach to reach a wide variety of
conventional and unconventional investment vehicles. See supra Part IV.A.I.b.
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tion that results in arbitrary and biased rulings.' They urge courts and
legislators to adopt clear and explicit rules, such as deregulation by entity type
or private agreement, to force courts to act consistently by treating like cases
alike, thereby reducing the likelihood of bias and arbitrary decisions.' The
proponents of deregulation essentially are echoing the classic fairness and
equal treatment arguments cited to defend the use of rules over standards:
rules are fairer than standards since rules promote equal treatment and reduce
the dangers of arbitrariness and bias. 4
Yet rules can also produce unjust and arbitrary results. Bright-line rules
produce errors of under-inclusiveness that can result in guilty behavior escap-
ing sanctions, produce unequal treatment in similar cases, provide opportuni-
ties to evade prosecution, and conceal bias.
a. Rules Permit Undesirable Conduct to Escape Punishment
Because a rule, by definition, constitutes an abstraction, it captures the
background principles and policies incompletely, and therefore produces
errors of under- and over-inclusiveness.' Even proponents of bright-line
rules, such as opting out by entity type, concede that such rules are under-
inclusive and some objectionable conduct will go unpunished. 6 For instance,
if limited liability companies are permitted to opt out of securities law cover-
age, fraudulent promoters who package their investment schemes as limited
liability companies could escape prosecution under the securities laws. In
addition, passive investors in limited liability companies who might benefit
from mandatory disclosure may no longer be entitled to such disclosure. 7
222. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 423, 434-36 ("[Vlague tests for determining...
securities status leave the question largely to judges' unpredictable policy preferences. When
extra-legal normative positions weigh heavily on the decision-making process, the parties' fates
will essentially be arbitrary .... ).
223. See Ribstein, Form andSubstance, supra note 2, at 840 (urging enactment of explicit
rules, rather than vague standards and open-ended definitions, to increase predictability and
reduce costs).
224. See CASsR. SUNSTErN, LEGALREASONiNGANDPOLrICALCONFLICT 112-13 (1996);
Sullivan, supra note 211, at 62.
225. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 129-30; Sullivan, supra note 211, at 58.
226. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 826-27.
227. Such bright-line rules could also prove over-inclusive. For example, underRibstein's
proposal, corporate stock and limited partnership interests would continue to be characterized
as securities and therefore would be subject to the securities laws, while general partnership
interests and limited liability company interests would be characterized as nonsecurities and thus
would be free from securities regulation. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at
809-10, 814, 827-28; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 41-42. Under this approach,
all investors in corporations and limited partnerships would be protected by the securities law,
regardless of their need for protection. As a result, sophisticated and knowledgeable investors
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The proponents of opting out by entity type artificially differentiate between
entities to create a clear rule, but in doing so they sacrifice the objectives of
the securities laws - the protection of investors.
b. Rules Prevent Equal Treatment
Under-inclusiveness also prevents equal treatment, if equal treatment
means treating like cases alike." For example, in determining the scope of
the securities laws, courts have focused on the economic realities of the
transaction and emphasized the substance of the transaction, rather than its
form. 9 Using this approach, courts have found that investments in some
general partnerships and limited liability companies constitute investment
contracts, and therefore the investors in these enterprises merit the protection
of the securities laws." The current regulatory structure affords courts the
in corporations or limited partnerships who have significant managerial control over an entity
would be protected by the securities laws whether they need or want such protection.
228. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 113; Sullivan, supra note 211, at 66.
229. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
230. Both general partnership interests and limited liability company interests typically
meet the first three prongs of the Howey investment contract test. Investments in both entities
generally involve an investment ofmoney in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit.
In the vast majority of situations, the key issue is whether profits are expected from the efforts
ofapromoter or athird party. See supra note 221 (describing four prongs offHowey investment
contract test).
In Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Fifth Circuit, applying the Howey investment contract test, noted that a general partner-
ship interest may be a security if the investor is so dependent on a promoter or a third party that
he in fact is unable to exercise meaningful managerial control. Id at 424. The Williamson court
described three situations in which a general partnership interest may constitute a security:
(1) if the agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the investors that
the arrangement distributes power as would a limited partnership; (2) if the investor is "so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising" his managerial powers; (3) if the investor is "so dependent on some unique entrepre-
neurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful" managerial power. Id The Williamson court
also recognized that other factors could give rise to dependence on the promoter or manager so
that the exercise of control would be effectively precluded. Id. at 424 n.15. A number of other
federal circuits have adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 399-
405 (reviewing decisions in other circuits).
Whether a limited liability company interest constitutes a security also turns on whether
profits are expected from the efforts of others. See Welle, supra note 115, at 445-54. The SEC
and at least 23 state securities commissions have taken the position that certain limited liability
company interests may be securities under the Howey investment contract test and its progeny.
Id at 441. At least 16 states have taken action under state securities laws against entities
offering or selling limited liability company interests. Id. at 429. In at least 12 states, state
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flexibility to treat similar cases alike in order to protect investors who warrant
protection."3 But under some opting-out proposals investors in these entities
could be denied the protection of the securities laws simply because of the
form of the transaction, even if they are the type of investors that the securities
laws were designed to protect. 2 Why should investors in certain general
partnerships or limited liability companies be singled out and denied protec-
tion, while other investors, with investments meeting the same criteria, are
afforded the protection of the securities laws? By narrowly focusing on the
form of the transaction, such rules fail to recognize the similarities and differ-
ences between transactions and consequently produce arbitrary and unjust
results. If fairness and equality mean treating like cases alike, such rules
prevent equal treatment.
c. Rules Encourage Evasion
In addition, bright-line rules temptthe unscrupulous to construct imagina-
tive schemes to exploit technicalities and evade the law.33 As Duncan Ken-
nedy noted, rules "allow the proverbial 'bad man' to 'walk the line,' that is,
to take conscious advantage ofunderinclusion to perpetrate fraud with impu-
courts or regulators have ordered promoters of limited liability companies to cease and desist
from offering or selling limited liability company interests in violation of state securities laws,
based on findings of sufficient evidence to conclude such interests were securities. Id. The
SEC has filed at least seven actions alleging violations of the federal securities laws for selling
interests in limited liability companies. Id at 428. Federal and state prosecutors have been
extremely successful in obtaining injunctions and cease and desist orders against certain limited
liability company promoters based on violations of the securities laws. Id. at 432-39.
231. For over 30 years, the United States Supreme Court broadly interpreted the definition
of a "security." In opinions such as Joiner, Howey, Tcherepnin, and Forman, the Court
broadened the definition of a "security" by emphasizing substance over form, focusing on the
economic realities of the transaction, and considering the remedial purposes of the securities
acts. See Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and the
Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1048-51 (1993).
Although the Court adopted a more literal approach in cases such as Landreth and Gould that
dealt with corporate stock, the economic realities test is still alive and well under the investment
contract line of cases and state courts continue to apply purpose-based and economic reality-
based tests to determine what constitutes a security. See id. at 1052, 1066-68, 1088-91.
232. Under McGinty's proposal, limited liability companies would be permitted to opt
out of securities law coverage, while presumably other forms of business organizations would
not be afforded the right to opt out., See McGinty, supra note 2, at 371, 375, 437. Under
Ribstein's "intermediate private ordering approach," corporate stock and limited partnership
interests would continue to be treated as securities; however, general partnership interests and
limited liability company interests would be presumed to be nonsecurities. See Ribstein,
Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 810, 814-15; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2,
at 41-45.
233. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 133; Kennedy, supra note 211, at 1773.
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nity.'" 4 In the securities law context, selective deregulation by entity type
would encourage every dishonest promoter to structure his transaction as a
limited liability company or a general partnership to avoid prosecution under
the securities laws. 5 Selective deregulation by entity type or private agree-
ment would invite unprincipled promoters to prey on the unsophisticated and
uninformed. These proposals would create incentives to exploit situations
where access to information or knowledge is unequally distributed. 6 Such
bright-line rules, in fact, serve as a blueprint for fraud. Rather than deterring
fraud, these proposals would facilitate fraud.
d. Rules Mask Bias
Bright-line rules also have political and social implications. Morton
Horwitz wrote that the rule of law is a conservative doctrine that "enables the
shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own
advantage." 7 Bright-line rules based on technical, definitional legalisms or
waiver of rights benefit the economically privileged who are well-educated,
legally savvy, or can afford the advice of counsel. In the securities law con-
text, rules work to the advantage of issuers and promoters and to the detriment
of investors. For example, opting-out legislation based on legalisms, such as
the form of the transaction, or technicalities, such as waivers set forth in fine
print, would create traps for the uneducated, unsophisticated, uninformed, or
unwary. Rules ofthis sort maguify the disparity in bargaining power between
234. Kennedy, supra note 211, at 1696.
235. Professors Branson and Okamoto observed that once courts began presuming that
general partnership interests were not securities, "[e]very promoter who knew what she was
doing, or who had a decently schooled transactional lawyer, structured their deal as a general
partnership." Branson & Okamoto, supra note 231, at 1081. As limited liability company
legislation began to sweep the country, several commentators argued that limited liability
company interests would not and should not be treated as securities. See, e.g., 1 RiSTEM &
KEATINGE, supra note 41, § 14.02, at 14-5 (May 1994) (proposing at least presumption against
"security" characterization for limited liability company interests or proposing that limited
liability company interests be characterized as nonsecurities because limited liability company
interests are closely held); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securi-
ties?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992) (arguing that limited liability company interests normally
do not satisfy definition of security). State regulators charged that as a result many unscrupu-
lous promoters began packaging their investment products as limited liability companies in an
attempt to avoid federal and state securities laws. See John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of
Company Attracts Many-Some Legal, Some Not, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at BI; John R.
Emshwiller, SEC Sets Sights on Certain Limited Liability Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3 1,
1994, at B2.
236. See Sullivan, supra note 211, at 66.
237. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J.
561, 566 (1977) (book review).
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parties familiar with legal formalities and parties without legal assistance or
prior experience.s Moreover, in virtually every dispute, it is the investor
who invokes the protection of the securities laws. These proposals would
reduce the legal rights of investors, reduce their success in litigation, and
reduce their chances of recovery by eliminating causes of action under the
securities laws. Hence, these seemingly neutral rules actually mask an under-
lying bias with important political, as well as social, implications. 9
If our goal is to promote fairness, equity, and equal treatment, the current
regulatory structure furthers these objectives better than bright-line rules, such
as deregulation by entity type or private agreement. Congress purposefully
defined the term "security" in broad and general terms so as to reach even
novel, irregular, and uncommon instruments thatpossess the same characteris-
tics as investment contracts or other securities.24° This open-ended definition
decreases errors of under-inclusiveness by making it more difficult for objec-
tionable conduct to escape punishment. Flexible tests, such as the investment
contract test, help thwart attempts to evade the law through technicalities and
legal formalism.24 The investment contract test also permits particularized
case-by-case analysis that affords courts the flexibility to treat like cases alike.
In addition, a fact-specific, purpose-based approach allows courts to take into
account individual circumstances and therefore is more likely to yield fairer,
more equitable results. Consequently, the current regulatory structure is
actually fairer, less arbitrary, and more equitable than the bright-line rules
proposed by the advocates of selective deregulation.
2. Predictability, Efficiency, and Utility
Legal academics, particularly those associated with the law and econom-
ics movement, charge that the current definition of a "security," with its
judicial gloss, creates uncertainty that increases costs and produces economic
inefficiencies. They contend that tests, such as the investment contract test,
with its case-by-case analysis and focus on the economic realities of the
transaction, make it difficult to predict whether an interest is a "security," and
238. See Kennedy, supra note 211, at 1699-1700.
239. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 132.
240. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
241. In defining the statutory term "investment contract," the United States Supreme Court
purposefully adopted a case-by-case approach that looked at the substance of the transaction
rather than its form. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946). In doing so,
the Court stated, "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." Id. at 301. This language appears particularly
relevant today in light of current deregulatory proposals that would compromise investor
protection by elevating form over substance.
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therefore whether the transaction is governed by the securities laws.242 They
assert that this uncertainty increases both transaction and litigation costs for
businesses. First, such uncertainty forces some businesses to behave defen-
sively and comply with the securities laws, which may add unnecessary costs
to the transaction.24 Second, if the outcome of litigation is difficult to predict,
parties may have divergent views about whether the securities laws apply.
These divergent views increase negotiation costs and make it difficult to make
and price contracts.2 " Third, uncertainty, together with diverging expecta-
tions, also increases the likelihood of litigation when a dispute arises and
decreases the probability of settlement. 5 Fourth, such fact-specific, purpose-
based, multi-factored tests are difficult to apply, making litigation costly and
imposing a heavy burden on the courts.246
Proponents of bright-line rules contend that clear rules are more effi-
cient.247 They argue that bright-line rules, such as deregulation by entity type
or waiver, increase certainty and predictability, which enhances private
ordering by permitting parties to order their affairs more productively.248
They assert that parties are entitled to know in advance whether the law
applies, so that they can form expectations and plan their affairs accord-
ingly.249 In addition, rules constrain the scope of factual inquiry, making
litigation less costly and eliminating the need for complicated, time-consum-
ing, and repetitive lawsuits."
Rules, however, may not be as virtuous as they first appear. Rules may
not in fact provide greater certainty or predictability. At least in the context
of securities regulation, fact-specific, multi-factored, purpose-based tests may
produce greater certainty and predictability than the bright-line rules sug-
gested by the advocates of selective deregulation. In addition, the proposed
bright-line rules could serve to erode investor confidence, and thereby actually
undermine the efficient workings of the securities market. Moreover, while
economic efficiencyjudicial economy, and reducing the cost of regulation are
laudable goals, what aboutjustice? The economic advantages that bright-line
242. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 374; Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at
809.
243. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 374, 418; Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note
2, at 830.
244. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 809, 83 1.
245. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 418; Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at
809, 829-30.
246. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 825, 829-30.
247. See Rose, supra note 211, at 590, 609.
248. See Kennedy, supra note 211, at 1688; Sullivan, supra note 211, at 62.
249. See SUNSTErn, supranote 224, at 101, 114, 191;Kennedy, supranote 211, at 1688.
250. See Sullivan, supra note 211, at 58, 62-63.
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rules offer may be only fleeting, so is it worth sacrificing justice and investor
protection in the interim?
a. Rules Do Not Necessarily Improve Certainty or Predictability
Rules do not inevitably settle all cases in advance or provide greater
certainty or predictability."3 Language is imprecise. 2 In addition, language
is a product of context and culture.3 As a result, rules may leave gaps, the
language may create ambiguities, understandings may be disputed, meanings
may shift overtime, or circumstances may change.' 4 All these factors under-
mine any certainty or predictability that a rule might offer. What at first
appears to be a clear rule often becomes muddied by interpretation and
changing circumstances.3 5
There are numerous examples of this phenomenon in the securities law
context. For instance, the definition of a "security" in the federal securities
laws expressly includes the term "any note." 6 However, changes in the use
ofnotes by the financial community overtime and significant variations in the
character of these instruments caused a change in the meaning of the term
"note."" Hence, the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase "any
note" in the federal securities acts should not be interpreted to mean literally
"any note," but must be interpreted in light of what Congress was attempting
to accomplish." s The Court therefore looked behind the label at the surround-
ing circumstances, including the offering context, to determine if the instru-
ment labeled a "note" should be deemed a "security." 9 To aid in this deter-
mination, the Court established a four-factor "family resemblance" test to
identify when a "note" is a "security."2" Another example involves the
definition of the term "stock." In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,26' the
251. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 121.
252. See Rose, supra note 211, at 609.
253. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 122.
254. See id. at 122, 125, 131-32.
255. Cf Rose, supranote2l 1, at580-90(providingthreeexamplesinproperty lawcontext).
256. See SecuritiesActof 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. 111996); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); supra note 103 (providing
text of Securities Act's definition of "security").
257. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1990) (indicating that term "note"
should be interpreted in light of purposes of securities laws); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,
471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985) (discussing broad interpretation of term "note"); see also 2 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 167, at 875 n.18 (tracing changes in meaning of term "note").
258. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
259. See id. at 64-70.
260. See id at 66-67.
261. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
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United States Supreme Court held that if an instrument bears the label "stock"
and possesses the characteristics typically associated with stock, the instru-
ment is a "security."262 The Court noted that an instrument's label is not
determinative. 63 The Court identified five characteristics typically associated
with stock to be used in determining when an instrument bearing the label
"stock" is a "security."2"
In these and other cases,265 seemingly precise and specific language
nevertheless produced uncertainty. Courts promulgate multi-factored, fact-
specific, purpose-based tests to define terms, so that what was once a sharp-
edged rule now resembles a standard. If history is any predictor, legislation
permitting parties to opt out of securities regulation by choice of entity or
waiver will fare no better in this game of interpretation. For example, if
limited liability companies are permitted to opt out of securities law coverage
by private agreement, courts will find themselves needing to define what
constitutes a "limited liability company. '  After years of litigation, a four-
part or five-part test will emerge to determine when an entity is a "limited
liability company." Until then, there will be uncertainty, and even after a test
262. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985); see also Gould v.
Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985) (applying standard from Landreth).
263. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 848-51 (1975) (stating that emphasis should be on "economic reality").
264. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 704; Forman, 421 U.S.
at 851.
265. Another illustration involves certificates of deposit. In Marine Bankv. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551 (1982), the United States Supreme Court excluded certain certificates of deposit from
the coverage of the federal securities laws, even though the definition of a "security" expressly
includes the term "certificate of deposit." See id at 557-59. The Court looked behind the label
and examined the factual context surrounding the transaction. See id. at 558. The Court held
that a bank-issued certificate of deposit was not a security because it was federally insured and
the purchasers therefore did not need the extra layer of protection provided by the federal
securities laws. See id. at 558-59.
266. Since a limited liability company is a creature of state law, many variations and
permutations exist. In addition, the limited liability company is a relatively new form of business
association, so it is still evolving. I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, § 1.02, at 1-2. If it
is not clear what constitutes "stock," a "note," or a "certificate of deposit," then what constitutes
a "limited liability company" is sure to produce similar confusion. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has stated than an instrument's label is not determinative. See supra text
accompanying note 263. Courts therefore will need to identify the characteristics usually
associated with a "limited liability company" or decide which state's law will serve as a template
to describethefeatures ofatypical "limited liability company." Fraudulentpromoters attempting
to use limited liability companies to escape the reach of securities laws are likely to push the
boundaries by using limited liability companies for unintended purposes or organizing limited
liability companies as an investment vehicle with hundreds, or even thousands, ofimembers. See
Welle, supra note 115, at 431-32 & n.29 (noting that some limited liability companies already
have hundreds ofimembers). Such uses would call into question whether these entities are truly
"limited liability companies" and could result in refining the definition further.
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becomes generally accepted, parties will hold differing views about how
courts should interpret each factor. Gray areas at the boundaries of the law
will materialize. In addition, any waiver provision will generate an enormous
amount of litigation.267 Consequently, bright-line rules do not insure either
certainty or predictability. Over time, these bright-line rules would evolve
into standards, so what have we ultimately gained in return for the values we
have sacrificed?
b. Standards May Provide Greater Certainty and Predictability
At least in the securities law context, fact-specific, purposed-based tests,
such as the investment contract test, may be more useful, efficient, and
predictable than the bright-line rules that the advocates of selective deregula-
tion propose.268 Congress purposefully defined the term "security" in broad
and general terms so as to include within the definition the countless assort-
ment of instruments that fall within the ordinary understanding of what
constitutes a security.269 This broad and general definition recognizes the
boundlessness of human ingenuity and the dynamic, ever-changing nature of
the securities market. For over fifty years, courts have used the investment
contract test and its case-by-case approach to reach a wide variety of invest-
ment vehicles, both conventional and unconventional.27 Accordingly, inves-
tors have come to understand that the securities laws apply to any arrange-
ment, no matter how new or unusual and no matter what the label, where one
invests in a common enterprise with an expectation of deriving profits sub-
stantially from the efforts of others.2 '
The investment contract test's basic definition of a security has served
this country well for over half a century. The test captures the essence of
what is meant by the term "security" by describing in general terms the types
of arrangements that are ordinarily considered securities. In UnitedHousing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,27 the United States Supreme Court observed that
the investment contract test "embodies the essential attributes that run through
all of the Court's decisions defining a security."'  As a result, the investment
267. See infra Part IV.C.4.
268. Cf Rose, supra note 211, at 609 (noting that standard, such as "commercial reason-
ableness" that relies on socially understood conventions, is more predictable to commercial
traders than certain bright-line rules, such as mailbox rule).
269. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555-56, 559; United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975).
270. See HAZEN, supra note 113.
271. See supra note 221 (describing elements of four-prong Howey investment contract
test).
272. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
273. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
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contract test, and its definition of a "security," provides a basic standard - an
overarching definition to guide both issuers and investors. The test has
become an accepted and socially understood convention in the business
community, and has proven flexible enough to adapt to constantly-changing
business environments. The advocates of selective deregulation, however,
propose bright-line rules that would create exceptions to the investment
contract test. To change the investment contract test, by creating exceptions
based on choice of entity or waiver, would only generate confusion and place
unrealistic demands upon investors.
The proponents of selective deregulation are asking us to replace reliance
on a common understanding and a basic rule of thumb with bright-line rules
that would muddy investor understanding. With selective deregulation by
entity type, the rules would differ by entity.274 The investment contract test
could no longer be used as a general guide. Investors would have to memorize
what investment forms constitute securities. Is it fair to expect investors, or
lawyers for that matter, who often fail to understand the differences between
various forms of business organizations,275 to recognize which forms are
subject to the securities laws and which are not? With waiver, is it reasonable
to expect the average investor to read and to fully comprehend the implica-
tions of waiver provisions set forth in the fine print of some investment
document? Are waivers reasonable given that antiwaiver prohibitions have
been in effect for almost sixty-five years?276 These bright-line tests would
catch unsophisticated investors and practitioners by surprise and create a
bonanza for fraudulent promoters. Rather than promoting predictability,
efficiency, and utility, such bright-line rules would undermine common
understandings, disrupt investor expectations, and complicate the law. In the
securities law context, there appears to be a great deal more certainty and
clarity in socially understood conventions, such as the investment contract
test, than in legalistic, bright-line rules based on technicalities.
c. Rules May Erode Investor Confidence
The reform proposals, particularly selective deregulation by entity type,
directly conflict with prior case law and could erode investor confidence.
Congress initially enacted the securities laws to restore investor confidence
274. See supra note 232 (describing McGinty's and Ribstein's proposals for deregulation
by entity type).
275. See Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of Limited Liability Entities, 52 Bus.
LAW. 605, 617-18 (Larry E. Ribstein & Mark A. Sargent eds., 1997) (discussing current
confusion caused by too many different entity statutes and noting that lawyers and their clients
need time to digest all changes or else need much simpler legislative scheme).
276. See supra Part IV.A.I.c. (discussing antiwaiver provisions).
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in the capital markets.277 Congress intended the securities laws to govern the
various types of instruments ordinarily and commonly considered to be
securities in the commercial world.27 The United States Supreme Court
therefore has stated on numerous occasions that the investing public's expec-
tations are relevant to determining whether an instrument is a security.279 The
Court also has held that certain instruments are securities based on such public
expectations."0
Given the many years the investment contract test has been employed, an
investor would be justified in assuming the securities laws apply to passive
investments of all types, whatever the label. If an investor in a general part-
nership or limited liability company intended to rely on the efforts of others,
clearly such interests would constitute securities under the investment contract
test.2 ' A reasonable investor, therefore, would be justified in believing that
the securities laws apply to the transaction. No countervailing factors would
lead a reasonable person to question her characterization of the interest as a
security. The investor's reasonable expectations would support a finding that
such interests were securities. The exceptions and waivers proposed by the
advocates of selective deregulation would conflict with the investor's reason-
able expectations. Such exceptions and waivers would result in investor
confusion and create traps for the unwary that could erode investor confidence
and undermine the efficient workings of the securities market.2"2
d And What About Justice?
Clearly, economic efficiency,judicial economy, and reducing the cost of
regulation are important goals, but should they effectively trump all other
policy concerns? Slashing investors' legal rights- and their chances ofrecov-
ery through litigation - would undoubtedly reduce the amount of litigation.8 3
277. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982).
278. See id. at 555-56.
279. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 693-94 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 850-51 (1975).
280. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (stating that Court "will consider instruments to be 'securi-
ties' on the basis of such public expectations"); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687,694 (citing public's
expectations and finding that common stock is "security").
281. See supra note 230 (discussing application of investment contract test to general
partnership interests and to limited liability company interests).
282. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 185, at 673-77 ("Fraud reduces allocative
efficiency."); Stout, supra note 184, at 713 ("[F]raud... erodes investor confidence.").
283. Cf Joseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
569,570 (1994) (responding to proposal to reduce appellate court dockets and noting that "[i]t
is indisputable that cutting back on people's legal rights, and hence on their chance of legal
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In fact, a significant amount of litigation could be avoided by just repealing the
securities laws. But do we want to sacrifice investor protection for the sake of
bright-line rules, convenience, cost cutting, and docket control, particularly if
such rules primarily benefit the economically privileged?284 Do we want to
inform investors that the application of equitable principles takes too long and
costs too much, so they no longer have a claim?285 In the securities law context,
these opting-out proposals only serve certain pocketbooks, not justice.
e. Any Economic Advantage May Be Fleeting
Finally, any economic advantage that may be gained from adopting rules
may be lost ifjudges find the rule's over- or under-inclusiveness unpalatable
and devote their time to devising end-runs around the rule.286 As Duncan
Kennedy so vividly described, rules become corrupted when judges are
"simply unwilling to bite the bullet, shoot the hostages, break the eggs to make
the omelette and leave the passengers on the platform. 287 In responsejudges
create exceptions, manipulate facts, distinguish cases, grant equitable relief,
consider intent, or develop new common law theories to remedy the injustice.
Kennedy observed, "Each successful evasion makes it seem more unjust to
apply the rule rigidly in the next case; what was once clear comes to be
surrounded by a technical and uncertain penumbra that is more demoralizing
to investment in form than an outright standard would be.,
288
In the securities law context, exceptions and waivers based on entity
classification would encourage every fraudulent promoter to structure his
transaction as a limited liability company or general partnership to avoid the
securities laws. Private ordering would invite unscrupulous promoters to prey
on the unsophisticated and uninformed. The effect of these proposals is to
leave those investors who are least able to protect themselves vulnerable to the
schemes of clever promoters. Ifthese bright-line rules permit such egregious
conduct to go unpunished, courts will be encouraged to create exceptions or
develop equitable theories to redress these wrongs. Judges will be unwilling
success, will cut back on their incentive to litigate").
284. Cf Rose, supra note 211, at 593 ("[it would corrode our moral understanding of
ourselves as a society if we were to permit gross unfairness to reign simply for the sake of
retaining clear rules and rational ex ante planning, particularly if those rules covertly serve the
wealthy and powerful.").
285. Cf Grodin, supra note 283, at 570 (responding to proposal to reduce appellate court
dockets). Grodin noted that "to tell a party that he is going to lose because the courts have
decided that the application of otherwise appropriate principles would take too much of their
time is not likely to be seen as a manifestation ofjustice." IM
286. See Sullivan, supra note 211, at 63.
287. Kennedy, supra note 211, at 1701.
288. IdE; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 224, at 126.
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to sit idly by while the elderly are fleeced of their pension funds. Dramatic
and disproportionate losses to investors will pressure courts to act.2"9 As
judges attempt to remedy the injustice that these bright-line rules produce, the
law will become muddied by interpretation, equitable second-guessing, and
exceptions. As a result, any benefits these bright-line rules might offer will
be only fleeting.
If our objective is to promote predictability, efficiency, and utility, the
current regulatory structure may further these goals better than bright-line
rules, such as deregulation by entity type or private agreement. Bright-line
rules do not insure either certainty or predictability. Fact-specific, purpose-
based tests that reflect socially understood conventions may actually provide
more certainty and clarity than legalistic, bright-line rules based on technicali-
ties. The rules proposed by the advocates of selective deregulation may, in
fact, produce economic inefficiencies. But even if economic efficiency,
judicial economy, and reducing the cost of regulation are important objectives,
are they more important than justice? In addition, any economic advantages
offered by these bright-line rules may be only transitory, so should we forsake
other values for merely temporary gains in efficiency? For these reasons, the
current regulatory structure may prove more predictable, more efficient, and
more useful than the bright-line rules proposed by the advocates of selective
deregulation.
C. The Dangers of Permitting Waiver
Legislators enacted the securities laws to protect the rights ofinvestors.2 *
Should investors be permitted to bargain away these statutory protections?
Should parties be free to waive their rights and contract out of this statutory
scheme? Advocates of selective securities law deregulation contend that
participants in certain business ventures should be permitted to choose
whether to be covered by the securities laws.29 Under the reform initiatives,
parties would be free to waive the protections of the securities laws through
choice of entity or by private agreement.2" In defense of these measures, the
289. Carol Rose observed, "A strong element of moral judgment runs through the cases in
which mud [standards] supersedes crystal [rules]." Rose, supra note 211, at 597. According to
Rose, dramatic or disproportionate loss appears to drive courts to muddy rules with exceptions,
equitable second-guessing, and post hoe discretionary judgments. See id. at 578-79,597,600.
290. See REGULATION OF SECURITIES, S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted in I
FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMrITE, FEDERAL SEcuRIEs LAWS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 89 (1983) ("The purpose of this bill is to protect the
investing public and honest business."); see also supra Part IV.A.l.a (discussing purposes of
securities laws).
291. See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 2, at 371,423.
292. See, e.g., Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812.
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proponents of private ordering cite core conservative principles, such as
freedom of contract, individualism, and self-reliance. They also stress policy
considerations, such as the need to respect private preferences, protect
individual autonomy, facilitate private contracting, promote economic free-
dom, reduce regulatory costs, and increase productivity, efficiency, and
profitability.
The advocates of selective deregulation, however, fail to adequately
appreciate the extent to which their proposals conflict with the underlying
tenets of the securities laws. Adoption of reform initiatives that permit waiver
of securities law coverage would require not only repeal or modification of the
securities laws' antiwaiver provisions, but also a rejection of the legislative
policies embodied in the securities laws as they are currently written. The
proponents of selective deregulation are asking us to abandon long-standing
policies favoring investor protection to adopt reforms that are premised on
myths, not reality. The reform initiatives would result in the adoption of
industry-protective waiver terms that individual investors would have little or
no power to change, thereby actually reducing competition. The reform
initiatives also would encourage securities-industry professionals to lure
investors into Faustian bargains at a time when they lack both bargaining
power and knowledge. Neither the market nor disclosure statements would
protect investors adequately. In the end, the reform initiatives would only
generate more litigation on new issues: whether waivers under such circum-
stances can be knowing, voluntary, and intentional.
1. Legislative Policy Argues Against Allowing Waiver
Legislators feared that sellers might attempt to maneuver buyers into
waiving their rights under the securities laws. To prevent overreaching and
to counter the often superior bargaining power of sellers, lawmakers included
explicit antiwaiver provisions in the securities laws.293 These provisions
prohibit individuals from waiving their statutory rights. Both federal and state
securities laws void any condition, stipulation, or agreement that waives
compliance with the securities laws, thereby making any agreement to waive
the substantive protections of the securities laws unenforceable.294 The
antiwaiver statutes demonstrate that legislators considered the protection of
investors to be of paramount importance.295 Enactment of the antiwaiver
293. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,432,435,438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also supra Part IV.A. 1.c.
(discussing antiwaiver provisions).
294. See supra note 120 (providing text of statutory antiwaiver provisions).
295. See Darrell Hall, Note, No Way Out: AnArgumentAgainst PermittingParties to Opt
Out of US. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 57, 61 (1997).
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provisions also indicates that lawmakers already have considered whether
investor protection should take precedence over contractual freedom. The
inclusion of antiwaiver provisions in the securities laws provides compelling
evidence that legislators determined that investor protection was their primary
concern and the public policies reflected in these laws should not be thwarted
by private agreements.2
Any agreement to opt out of the securities laws clearly violates the
antiwaiver provisions. Such an agreement would constitute an impermissible
waiver of substantive rights that would serve to thwart legislative intent.
Adoption of the reform initiatives, therefore, would require not only the
repeal, modification, or preemption of state and federal antiwaiver provisions,
but a change in legislative policy as well.
Reform initiatives that would permit opting out of securities regulation
either by choice of entity orby private agreement unquestionably conflict with
the antiwaiver provisions.297 The opting-out initiatives certainly are contrary
This conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history ofthe federal securities laws. For example,
the Senate Report stated in no uncertain terms that investor protection was of primary concern:
The aim [of the Securities Act] is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the
sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to
place adequate and true information before the investor;, to protect honest enter-
prise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by
dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to
bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has
grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and
restoring buying and consuming power.
REGULATION OF SECuRrms, S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted in I FEDERAL BAR
ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITrEE, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS, LEGISLATIVEHISTORY
1933-1982, at 89 (1983).
296. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364 (2d Cir. 1993).
297. In his articles, Ribstein urged courts to adopt what he called an "intermediate private
ordering" approach. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812. Under this
approach, courts would construe the term "security" so as to permit private ordering by charac-
terizing general partnership interests and limited liability company interests as nonsecurities.
See id. at 810; Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 26, 42. Ribstein argued that opting
out of securities law coverage by choice of entity, therefore, avoids the statutory prohibitions
against waiver. See Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 812.
Ribstein basically proposed that choice of entity constitutes an election of securities law
coverage tantamount to a contractual waiver. Ribstein in essence urged a form of judicial
activism to exclude certain types of business associations from securities law coverage. But any
attempt to develop bright-line rules, such as the per se exclusion of certain types of business
transactions from securities law coverage, or to move away from the case-by-case analysis
dictated by the Howey investment contract test would conflict with precedent, violate the
antiwaiver provisions by seeking to do indirectly what could not be done directly, and thwart
legislative intent. As McGinty noted, the case law does not support permitting investors to
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to legislative intent as it is embodied in the existing securities laws. More-
over, they run counter to legislative policy that favors investor protection over
contractual freedom. Adoption of the opting-out initiatives would constitute
more than a dramatic shift in legislative policies - it would constitute a
complete reversal in legislative judgment. It would require legislators to
renounce long-standing policies that favor investor protection to adopt a
regime premised on the principle of caveat emptor.298 Such reforms not only
would undermine investor protection but could well lead to investor exploita-
tion. The advocates of selective deregulation fail to adequately appreciate the
extent to which their proposals conflict with the fundamental policies that
underlie the securities laws. As legislators astutely recognized by adopting
the antiwaiver provisions, the standards of fair play that the securities laws
establish must be mandatory and applicable to all if the laws' goals of protect-
ing the investing public and safeguarding the integrity of the market are to be
accomplished.
2. Economic Freedom and Contractual Freedom Are Myths
The arguments favoring waiver of securities law coverage are premised
largely on myths. The proponents of private ordering employ myths and
imagery to make their case for allowing contractual waiver of securities law
coverage.2' They seduce us with catch phrases such as "freedom of contract."
waive the protections of the securities laws through choice of entity. See McGinty, supra note
2, at 420-21. McGinty observed that "the presumption concerning coverage runs only in one
direction: if one purchases an interest in stock, one thereby obtains securities law protections,
whether one wants them or not." Id. at 420. With respect to waiver, McGinty noted that "[i]n
the other direction, recent legal trends have reduced the credibility of the proposition that by
choosing a certain form of investment, one can waive securities coverage." Id at 421. Addi-
tionally, statutory authority and the case law with respect to waiver clearly prohibit any
measures designed to allow parties to waive the substantive protections of the securities laws
through private agreement. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 481-82 (1989) (drawing clear distinction between waiver of substantive and proce-
dural provisions).
298. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("A
fundamental purpose, common to [the securities laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor....").
299. In his bookPhilosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, "A picture held
us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to
repeat itto us inexorably." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 115 (3d
ed. 1968). Wittgenstein also observed, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language." Id. at 109.
The proponents of selective deregulation hope to bewitch us with language and capture
us with their pictures. The language they use has tremendous emotional and psychological
appeal. For example, commentators have noted that the phrase "freedom of contract" seems to
capture our collective imagination and hold us captive, even though it has little to do with
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They draw us in with references to free markets, individual autonomy, and
self-reliance. They capture our imagination with their utopian vision of
perfectly competitive markets composed of fully-informed, autonomous actors
freely making utility-maximizing choices. They produce emotional, almost
visceral, reactions by making powerful appeals to deeply ingrained American
values, such as the need to respect private preferences, the importance of
freedom of choice, and our long history of promoting economic freedom.
They paint a vivid picture that captures our imagination, but the picture does
not reflect reality.
a. The Myth of Economic Freedom
Those who advocate permitting parties to opt out of securities law cover-
age are asking us to embrace their romantic vision of unregulated markets and
to welcome the reform initiatives as a first step on our return to a system of
laissezfaire. The notion of laissezfaire, however, is a myth."° No market
can exist without legal rules.01 As Cass Sunstein observed, markets "are not
a product of nature. On the contrary, markets are legally constructed instru-
ments, created by human beings hoping to produce a successful system of
social ordering.... Markets are (a particular form of) government interven-
tion.""3 2 Without the law of property, there would be no private property
rights. Without the law of contract, there would be no freedom to contract.0 3
Markets depend on government regulation. The market left to its own devices
will produce harmful, inefficient, unjust, and sometimes even disastrous
results?3 4 Legislative controls, such as the securities laws, are necessary to
prevent exploitation, to discourage unfair dealings, and to correct market
failures. 5 The law's coercive force creates orderly markets, which in turn
facilitates individual transactions. To argue that deregulation is somehow a
return to a natural state is more than misleading.
The securities laws were enacted to restore order, to foster fair play, and
to insure the integrity of the financial markets.3" The widespread fraud,
reality. See Karl Johnson, CommercialLaw, 13 N.M. L. REV. 293,293(1983); Mooney, supra
note 24, at 1134-35, 1187.
300. See CAssR. SUNsTEIN, FREE MARKETs AND SocIAL JusTICE 5 (1997).
301. See id
302. Id. at 384.
303. See id at 5.
304. See id. at 271; see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LnvTrrs OF FREEDOM OF CON-
TRACT 7(1993) (cataloguing conventional forms ofmarketfailure, such as monopoly, externali-
ties, and informational failures, which author discussed in greater detail in later chapters).
305. See SUNSTEiN, supra note 300, at 282.
306. See supra Part IV.A.I.a.
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manipulation, and victimization of investors during the 1930s demonstrated
that some form of market regulation was needed to protect investors from the
predatory behavior of securities-industry professionals." 7 Congress recog-
nized that individual investors were at a distinct disadvantage in dealing with
securities-industry professionals who possessed greater knowledge, experi-
ence, information, and economic power.0 ' Congress hoped to level the
playing field by prohibiting fraudulent practices and by requiring full disclo-
sure."° The securities laws were intended to safeguard investors from over-
reaching by industry professionals who held inherently superior bargaining
positions. °
b. The Myth of Contractual Freedom
Now, in the name of contractual freedom, the advocates of deregulation
wish to permit parties to waive coverage of the securities laws. They want to
allow investors to bargain away their substantive protections. Given the gross
inequality in bargaining power, knowledge, and interest between buyers and
sellers of securities, without regulation, buyers would be at the mercy of
sellers. Freedom of contract in an unregulated securities market is a naive
myth.3 1 ' The classical ideal of "freedom of contract" depends entirely on an
obviously unrealistic model of contract formation where all transactions are
negotiated by sophisticated, fully-informed parties of equal bargaining power,
capable of protecting their own self interests and of arriving at mutually bene-
ficial agreements that will maximize utility for both parties. It is premised on
the notion that contractual obligations are freely and voluntarily assumed
through the course of negotiations. Unfortunately, this model and its underly-
ing assumptions do not reflect reality.
31 2
307. See, e.g., STOCKEXCHANGEPRACTICES, S. REP. No. 73-1455, at I (1934), reprinted
in II FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECURITIES LAW COMMITrEE, FEDERAL SECURTImES LAWS,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 1257 (1983).
308. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,435 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
309. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,251(1987) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
310. See id. at 253 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
311. Betty Mensch wrote, "Freedom of contract has been conclusively labelled a naive
myth, but the forms of that mythology still bind." Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as
Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 754 (1981) (book review). Mensch noted that "the supposed
freedom of the past was false, both in theory and in social practice.... [Tihe resurrection of
old myths will not make the modem problem go away." Id at 768.
312. Commentators such as Karl Johnson go so far as to say, "'Freedom of Contract' is
nonsense and an utter fiction .... " Johnson, supra note 299, at 293.
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Reform Initiatives Would Result in Industry-Protective Terms. If the
reform initiatives are adopted, securities-industry professionals and savvy
industry counsel quickly would realize the benefits that issuers, promoters,
and dealers would reap if investors waived securities law coverage. Issuers
and their attorneys, when feasible, would structure their transactions so as to
avoid securities regulation." 3 If parties are permitted to opt out of securities
regulation by private agreement, waiver provisions would become standard
terms in investment contracts. If parties are permitted to opt out by choice of
entity, entities exempt from securities law coverage would become the organi-
zational forms of choice.
Even in highly competitive markets, standard terms tend to expand within
and across industries." 4 Companies adopt form contracts with standard terms
to reduce the costs of contract formation, to minimize uncertainty and liabil-
ity, to obtain a strategic advantage in the bargaining process, and to control
the relationship." 5 In an effort to protect their client's interests, attorneys tend
to draft up to the limits permitted by law." 6 Over time, more and more risks
are shifted to the purchaser, and the forms accumulate these seller-protective
provisions.317 Eventually, competitors in an industry begin to offer the same
terms, which then become an industiy standard.318 As waiver provisions
313. See supra note 235.
314. See David S. Schwartz,EnforcingSmallPrinttoProtectBigBusiness: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of CompelledArbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 36. In his
article, Schwartz traced the increased use ofpre-dispute arbitration clauses that have found their
way into standard form contracts in the securities, health care, insurance, banking, and finance
industries. See generally id These clauses also are appearing more frequently in employment
contracts. See id. at 53-54.
315. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1227 (1983); Schwartz, supra note 314, at 57.
316. See Rakoff, supra note 315, at 1205 ("T]he professional draftman's goal isto protect
his client as fully as possible.... [T]he temptation, and indeed the art, is to draft up to the limit
allowed by law .... "); Schwartz, supra note 314, at 58 ("[Ihe drafter of legal documents,
motivated to protect (even overprotect) his client's interests, inevitably tends to 'draft up to the
limit allowed by law'. ... ).
317. Karl Llewellyn observed in the 1930s that, even in highly competitive markets,
standardized contracts resulted in the "accumulation of seller-protective instead of customer-
protective clauses." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? -An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704, 734 (1931).
318. Although customers do sometimes shop terms, Todd Rakoff noted that the terms
customers shop for are determined "largely by immediacy of impact (cash or credit), by ease of
comparability (size of down payment), and, to a certain extent, by the customs and practices of
the trade (warranty terms in some industries at some times)." Rakoff, supra note 315, at 1226.
Consequently, firms tend to compete on terms that capture the customer's attention, such as
price, rather than on nonfinancial terms. See id. at 1227. Moreover, if all firms in the market
impose the same nonfinancial terms, shopping becomes impossible.
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become commonplace or as the industry begins to favor certain organizational
forms, individual investors will find themselves unable to negotiate for
different terms, such as securities law coverage.
Individual Investors Have Little or No Power to Alter Such Terms."9
Investment terms often are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. An indi-
vidual investor, more often than not, lacks the economic power to individually
alter the terms of the offer. Many investors, in fact, may not even focus on
certain nonfinancial terms in the subscription agreement or formation docu-
ments until it is time to actually sign the forms. Realizing that they have little
or no power to separately negotiate new terms, investors often fail to read the
forms they sign. Usually the investor is not represented by counsel and
therefore may not fully understand the legal significance of what he is
signing 20 Even if the investor reads and understands the terms, attempts to
change provisions typically will be met with resistance, including responses
such as the terms are dictated by counsel, the clause is an industry standard,
we cannot make an exception for one investor, or we do not have the authority
to change the terms.
For investors presented with form contracts, freedom of contract is more
myth than reality. If terms are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, it is
difficult to characterize the obligations as voluntarily assumed orto defend the
act as an expression of individual autonomy. 2' No one's freedom is enhanced
by allowing one party to dictate terms to another, especially when the terms
foisted upon the weaker party result in the waiver of important substantive
rights.
3 22
319. The implications and inevitable consequences that flow from the use of standard form
contracts is examined in numerous law review articles, most notably in seminal articles such as
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943), and Rakoff, supra note 315. See Johnson, supra note 299, at 293-
94,300-03 (discussing effect of standardized forms on contracting process); Michael H. Schill,
An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 515-30 (1991)
(modeling mortgagor-mortgagee interaction and discussing effect of standard forms on these
transactions); Schwartz, supra note 314, at 55-60 (discussing factors that have led to prolifera-
tion of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in standard form contracts).
320. Karl Johnson colorfully described these standard form agreements as "nothing but
mysterious incantations to the uninitiated... which even if understood render the effort to
understand a cruel and futile exercise, for the terms they contain are fixed and unalterable."
Johnson, supra note 299, at 293.
321. Michael Trebilcock wrote, "[mo hold parties bound to standard form contracts which
they had entered into but which they had not read or understood does not rest comfortably with
a theory of contractual obligation premised on individual autonomy and consent. Clearly, in
many, perhaps most cases, meaningful consent is absent." TREBILCOCK, supra note 304, at 119.
322. See Rakoff, supra note 315, at 1235-38 (concluding that "enforcing boilerplate terms
trenches on the freedom of the adhering party").
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Waiver Constitutes a Faustian Bargain That Should Not Be Enforced.
The reform initiatives would encourage securities-industry professionals to
lure investors into Faustian bargains. Like Faust who entered into a contract
with the Devil well in advance of its unfortunate consequences, the reform
initiatives would allow investors to strike a bargain with the Devil at a time
when the investor cannot adequately appreciate the significance of the act. 3
The reform initiatives would invite securities-industry professionals to take
advantage of investors at a time when they are at a substantial disadvantage
due to disparities in bargaining power, knowledge, information, and experi-
ence.
324
Under the proposed reform initiatives, investors could be asked to waive
securities law coverage at the time of investment. The reform initiatives,
therefore, allow an individual to prospectively waive his right to recover for
future harm, before any problems or disputes arise. 2 Investors could be
asked to waive their rights during this honeymoon period when the venture
looks extremely profitable and the possibility of a dispute appears remote. 26
In fact, most investors would not even consider making an investment if the
possibility of a dispute appeared likely.327 Many, if not most, investors will
not understand fully the effect of the waiver. 28 Most investors have had little
or no experience with the types of disputes that give rise to securities law
claims. Consequently, investors tend to be relatively uninformed about the
323. Cf Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 593-94 (drawing analogy between Faust's bargain with
Devil and waiver provisions included in initial loan agreements).
324. Cf Schwartz, supra note 314, at 114 (discussing disparities in bargaining power and
information in context of pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
325. Cf id. at 39, 110-21 (arguing that pre-dispute arbitration clauses constitute prospec-
tive waivers of substantive rights).
326. In addition, securities-industry professionals are likely to persuade investors that by
opting out of the securities laws and related disclosure requirements the enterprise will save
unnecessary expenses and thereby increase potential profits.
327. Moreover, long-term business relationships require ameasure of trust and confidence.
Drawing attention to possible risks and focusing on the negative, such as exploring the possibil-
ity of fraud, could trigger emotional reactions and as practitioners say "queer the deal." See
John C. Coffee, Jr.,.The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1677 (1989); William A. Klein, The Modern Business
Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1555 (1982); Robert B.
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders 'Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U.
L.Q. 193, 224 (1988).
328. Some investors may not even be aware that they have waived their right to securities
law coverage. For example, investors who purchase securities in the secondary market may be
bound to waiver terms agreed to by the initial investors. Investors purchasing securities in the
secondary market, therefore, may not know that the securities laws do not apply. Consequently,
such purchasers may not discount the price of the security to reflect waiver. See Ribstein,
Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 27.
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likelihood or degree of future harm or the kinds of claims that they are waiv-
ing. 29 Individual investors generally are not represented by counsel, unless
the individual is making a fairly substantial investment. Also, an individual
investor is unlikely to take the time or incur the expense to research the
implications ofawaiver provision. Obtaining such information in many cases
may not be cost-effective or even reasonable.3 It is unrealistic to expect an
investor who lacks experience, legal advice, and information to fully appreci-
ate the consequences of waiving his statutory right to the protections provided
under the securities laws. On the other hand, securities-industry professionals
will seek prospective waivers because they have had past experiences with
securities law claims and are well aware that disputes arise. 1 Securities-
industry professionals generally employ legal counsel to advise them and it is
their lawyers who understand the effect of such waivers and therefore will
recommend obtaining waivers from investors.
An individual's ability to assess the risks and costs associated with
waiver is complicated further by multiple perceptual distortions that lead to
judgment errors.3 32 Behavioral research indicates that people discount the
importance of future events - particularly events far in the future.33 An
investor is likely to discount even further the significance of a waiver in
offering documents. Not only will the consequences occur in the future, but
the need for securities law coverage is uncertain. Studies also demonstrate
that human beings fail to accurately estimate the likelihood of low probability,
329. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel observed, "When a person is confronted with
a problem or risk for the first (or only) time in his life, the chance of error is greatest. Choices
that are made repeatedly and tested against experience are more likely to be accurate ......
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1434 (1989).
330. See Schill, supra note 319, at 526 ("Gathering sufficient data to make reasonably
accurate estimates of relatively rare events is both costly and time-consuming.").
331. Cf Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion
Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 226 (1998) (arguing that dispute resolution clauses are
more valuable to "repeat players" who know from experience that disputes will ensue).
332. Easterbrook and Fischel have stated, "Sometimes people's perceptual apparatuses do
not work well. They underestimate the chance that certain risks (floods, earthquakes, failures
of the products they buy) will come to pass and as a result may not choose rationally when
confronted with choices about such risks...." Easterbrook& Fischel, supra note 329, at 1434.
333. See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 594; see also Coffee, supra note 327, at 1676 ("[I]ndi-
viduals systematically underestimate future risk... [and] tend to discount excessively the risk
of future exploitation."); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998) ("[B]ehavioral research shows that people's judgments
about their future experience at the time of decision can be mistaken ... ."); Cass R. Sunstein,
BehavioralAnalysis ofLaw, 64 U. CHI.L.REV. 1175,1184-86 ("People'sjudgments abouttheir
experience at the time of decision can be mistaken; they may have a hard time assessing what
the experience will actually be like.").
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high loss events,334 such as securities fraud. In addition, human beings tend
to be unrealistically optimistic and overconfident abouttheir ownjudgment 35
They overestimate their prospects for success and underestimate their pros-
pects for failure.336 These perceptual distortions result in people incorrectly
believing that bad events are less likely to happen to them than to others.3
They falsely believe in their own immunity from harm. These self-serving
biases causes people to underestimate the probability of loss and thus under-
value the rights forfeited. The reform initiatives would permit securities-
industry professionals to take advantage of these disparities in bargaining
power, knowledge, information, and experience, and to use cognitive distor-
tions to solicit waivers at a time when an investor is most vulnerable. Rather
than encouraging these Faustian bargains, we should be protecting investors
from such predatory conduct.
3. Neither the Market Nor Legends Will Adequately Protect Investors
Advocates of private ordering argue that investors are protected by an
efficient market. They contend that as long as there are informed investors,
the market will discount the price of the security to reflect the absence of
securities law protections, thereby protecting the uninformed investor.33 This
theory assumes that there is an efficient market, meaning knowledgeable and
sophisticated investors with perfect information actively trading in the secu-
rity.339 Not all securities are actively traded. Relatively few firms are fol-
lowed by securities analysts and widely traded. Most businesses are small.
334. See Schill, supra note 319, at 525 & n.120 (citing numerous authority discussing
people's tendencies to ignore or discount low probability, high loss events when purchasing
insurance).
335. See Jolls et al., supra note 333, at 1524, 1537; Sunstein, supra note 333, at 1182.
336. See Schill, supra note 319, at 528 & nn.129-30 (discussing these perceptual distor-
tions in context of defaults on mortgage loans).
337. See Jolls et al., supra note 333, at 1524, 1541; Sunstein, supra note 333, at 1178,
1183.
338. See, e.g., Ribstein, Form and Substance, supra note 2, at 828; Ribstein, Private
Ordering, supra note 2, at 27-28.
339. This also assumes thatknowledgeable and sophisticated investors can accuratelyprice
the risks and costs associated with waiving all future disclosure rights and all potential securities
law claims with respect to a venture for the indeterminate future. But accurate pricing is only
feasible if parties understand what rights are being waived. Pricing necessarily will be inaccu-
rate in the context of a long-term, open-ended relationship in which the firm is seeking blanket
approval in advance for future transactions. For example, investors may trust current manage-
ment in the current business environment, but they cannot reasonably predict the actions of
future management under possibly different business conditions in the indeterminate future.
See Coffee, supra note 327, at 1667-71.
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Their securities are closely held and are not traded in an active market. There
are many small offerings and private offerings. The securities of such firms
are not priced by knowledgeable and sophisticated investors, such as under-
writers, institutional investors, or promoters who have been engaged in
numerous transactions. The price may not even represent the consensus of
many investors, let alone informed investors. As a result, the price of these
securities may not be discounted to reflect the cost ofwaiver. The market will
not protect investors who purchase securities that are thinly traded, rarely
traded, or never traded in an active market. Nor will the market protect
investors who purchase securities that are not priced by sophisticated and
knowledgeable investors. The market, therefore, will not protect a vast
number of investors.
Proponents of selective deregulation believe that disparities in bargaining
power, knowledge, information, and experience can be rectified by giving
clear notice to investors that the interests they are purchasing are not protected
by the securities laws. 4 Commentators have suggested, among other things,
that such notice be written in an entity's formation documents and on each
certificate evidencing an interest. 4 They also have suggested thatthe Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) could promulgate regulations dictating
minimum disclosure requirements. 42 Other commentators have suggested
requiring waiver terms in the offering documents to be clearly and conspicu-
ously highlighted in bold or all capital letters.343
Mandated disclosures will not solve the problems related to disparities
in bargaining power, knowledge, information, and experience. Generic
consumer disclosures have proven less than effective.3" It is difficult to craft
concise and understandable disclosure statements setting forth generic risks
that capture the reader's attention. 4 We have all, at one time or another,
disregarded or discounted generic warnings about risks. How many hundreds
of times have you failed to read legends and boilerplate language printed in
340. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 437 ("Giving clear notice to investors, this regime
would allow both [the issuer] and investors to reach a more voluntary equilibrium over how
much disclosure and securities regulation they wanted.").
341. See id
342. See id.
343. See Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 31.
344. See, e.g., Re-Examining Truth in Lending: Do Borrowers Actually Use Consumer
Disclosures?, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 3 (Winter 1998).
345. See Alan Schwartz& Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Marketsfor Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties andSecurity Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1459(1983)
("Decisionmakers face substantial practical problems in correctly ascertaining the odds,
developing concise and comprehensible formats for disclosure, and conveying the essential facts
in such a way that consumers will pay attention to them.").
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bold on products and in documents? Why would boilerplate disclosure
statements about the risk of waiver prove any more effective?
Even if we provide investors with adequate information about the risk of
waiver, investors still may not appreciate or be capable of accurately evaluat-
ing the risk. The problem is not just one of insufficient information; the
problem is people's inability to process such information and to assess one's
own risk. 46 For example, consumers have been bombarded with information
about the dangers of smoking, yet people continue to smoke because they fail
to appreciate the dangers they themselves face from smoking.347 Even factu-
ally informed people tend to minimize risks, believing that risks are less likely
to materialize for them than for others. 4 Self-serving biases, excessive
confidence in one's own judgment, and overoptimism undermine the efficacy
of generic disclosure statements and warning legends. 49 Consequently,
efforts to educate may not be able to counteract these strong and pervasive
cognitive and motivational distortions.
Moreover, if the investor has no bargaining power, what will be gained
by education? David Schwartz noted that we could require individuals to
attend an all-day seminar on the legal implications of waiver provisions.35 0
However, if the individual does not have the opportunity to bargain or shop for
terms, he has no choice but to consent to the waiver provision. The market
failure caused by lack of bargaining power, imperfect information, inadequate
knowledge, and inexperience cannot be corrected with generic warning labels
and legends. Important substantive rights are at stake. Investors will not be
asked simply to waive a single benefit; investors will be asked to waive all
rights and benefits provided by the securities laws. Are we willing to permit
individuals to contract out ofa statutory scheme designed to protect their rights
when we know that such waivers may be neither knowing nor voluntary?
4. Waivers Will Only Generate More Litigation
Permitting parties to waive coverage of the securities laws will only
generate more litigation. It is ironic that the advocates of selective deregula-
tion, who criticize the costly and time-consuming litigation spawned by the
current regulatory regime, urge adoption of reform measures that will un-
doubtedly produce even more lawsuits. The advocates of selective deregula-
346. See Jolls et al., supra note 333, at 1542; cf Schill, supra note 319, at 531-32 & n.141
(discussing problem of cognitive distortions in context of inability of mortgagors to estimate
their own probability of default).
347. See Jolls et al., supra note 333, at 1542.
348. See Sunstein, supra note 333, at 1184.
349. See Schill, supra note 319, at 531-32 & n. 141.
350. See Schwartz, supra note 314, at 131.
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tion criticize the current regulatory structure for requiring expensive, time-
consuming, fact-based, case-by-case analysis, and they object to the uncer-
tainty that such an approach creates.3 51 But reform measures that allow parties
to waive their legal rights are likely to generate even more time-consuming,
fact-based, case-by-case litigation. The reform measures they propose will
simply create a new playing field for additional litigation.
In a case involving the alleged waiver of federal securities laws claims,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined waiver as
"'the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right. It emphasizes
the mental attitude of the actor.' Since waiver is a voluntary act, there must
be knowledge of the right in question before the act of relinquishment can
occur."352 The court then went on to say that the "waiver of rights under the
[securities laws] should be limited to those cases where it is intended, and that
therefore the right in question must be found to be actually known before
waiver becomes effective. ' 353 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, a waiver
of securities law claims must be knowing, voluntary, and intentional.354
If the reform initiatives are adopted, we can look forward to a raft of
litigation concerning what constitutes a knowing, voluntary, and intentional
waiver of securities law coverage. In this and in other contexts, courts have
not been consistent in their holdings as to what facts are sufficient to support
a finding of waiver.355 For example, courts have differed as to what consti-
tutes knowledge of a right.356 Is it enough for the issuer simply to give the
investor notice that he is waiving his rights, or does the issuer have to explain
to the investor the rights that the investor is waiving? Must the issuer explic-
itly and painstakingly describe the rights that the investor is sacrificing? Must
351. See McGinty, supra note 2, at 374-75, 423, 434-36; Ribstein, Form and Substance,
supra note 2, at 808-11, 824-25.
352. Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964).
353. Id
354. Both federal and state securities laws void any agreement to prospectively waive
compliance with the securities laws. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Courts,
however, have found that the prohibition against waiver does not preclude the waiver of claims
in connection with settlement agreements, provided that the party has knowledge of the claims
released. See, e.g., Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1992);
Murtagh v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1974). The United
States Supreme Court also has concluded that pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not violate
the antiwaiver provisions. See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 479-84 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238
(1987). The securities law cases involving waiver tend to arise in these contexts.
355. See RoyalAir, 333 F.2d at 571.
356. Some courts have found that facts sufficient to give a party notice of a potential claim
is all that is needed to fulfill the knowledge requirement. Other courts have found that actual
knowledge ofa right is a prerequisite to waiver. See id; see also ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5D LmGA-
TION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 10B-5 § 237.02 (1994).
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the investor actually understand what rights he is waiving? What is required
for a voluntary waiver? Is it enough that the investor is given an opportunity
to read the agreement, or must the waiver terms be negotiable?
Moreover, courts tend to disfavor waivers of statutory rights.357 Judicial
hostility toward waivers has caused courts scrupulously to investigate whether
the relinquishment of the right was knowing, voluntary, and intentional. 58
The suspicious attitude that courts have demonstrated reflects their concern
that waivers invite overreaching. Some courts, therefore, have scrutinized
agreements purporting to limit a party's legal rights. In determining whether
a waiver is knowing and voluntary, courts have looked beyond the contract
language and considered the totality of the circumstances. 59 Citing such
cases, courts may be asked to consider, among other things, (i) the clarity and
specificity of the waiver language; (ii) the investor's education and business
experience; (iii) the amount of time that the investor had for deliberation
before signing the waiver; (iv) whether the investor knew, or should have
known, his rights upon execution of the waiver; (v) whether the investor was
encouraged to seek, or in fact received, benefit of counsel; and (vi) whether
there was an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement.3"
Some investors will claim that they did not understand the rights that they
were waiving, that crucial information was withheld, or that they were de-
ceived. Other investors may charge that waivers were obtained through
fraudulent or collusive actions. 6' Courts and lawmakers undoubtedly will be
asked to carve out exceptions. For example, consumer advocates may seek
the imposition of some type of suitability standard to protect investors who,
because of lack of education, experience, or sophistication, are incapable of
protecting themselves. 62 Advocates of private ordering may seek court
rulings, rules, or regulations that specify notice, knowledge, and disclosure
357. See Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler& Co., 534 F.2d 156, 180 (9th Cir. 1976) (Trask, J.,
concurring in opinion in part, but dissenting from judgment).
358. See Murtagh, 490 F.2d at 816.
359. See, e.g., Torrez v. Public Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 1990) (deciding
whether employee's signing of release at time of his employment termination constituted
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to bring employment discrimination action); Cirillo
v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1988) (deciding whether release signed in
exchange for enhanced retirement package constituted valid waiver of statutory rights underAge
Discrimination in Employment Act).
360. These factors are drawn from the factors set forth in Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689-90, and
in Cirillo, 862 F.2d at 451.
361. See, e.g., Binstein v. Haven Indus., Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,585, at 94,495 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Rosen v. Dick, [1974-1975 TransferBinder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,786, at 96,604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
362. See Ribstein, Private Ordering, supra note 2, at 31-32 (suggesting that suitability
standard, similar to accredited investor standard, may represent appropriate compromise).
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requirements that would detail what the issuer must state to constitute an
enforceable waiver. If the court opinions on waiver to date are any indication,
courts will fail to agree on one uniform standard.363 These issues will provide
fodder for the courts and take years to resolve. For these reasons, the reform
initiatives will merely spawn new rounds of litigation on new issues. The
reform initiatives will not reduce litigation; the reform initiatives will increase
litigation.
V. Shifting Preferences and a Call for Balance
Thomas McGarity observed that history may be "viewed as a cycle of
reform, resistance, and reaction - swinging like a pendulum, but like a pendu-
lum attached at its apex to a point that is itself lurching forward and back-
ward."3" America historically has alternated between public-oriented and
private-ordering regimes. 6 The economist Albert 0. Hirschman demon-
strated that reliance on either regime generates disappointment and a desire
for change that results in shifting preferences."'
While legal commentators have convincingly attacked the existence of
a clear public/private distinction,367 the continuing calls for deregulation and
privatization evidence an underlying shift in our legal and political culture.
363. See Miriam A. Cherry,Note, Not-So-ArbitraryArbitration: Using Title VIIDisparate
Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 267,291-98 (1998) (describing various standards courtshave applied innumerous contexts
to determine if waiver is knowing and voluntary).
364. McGarity, supra note 36, at 1471-72.
365. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND
PUBLIC AcTION 132 (1982). Hirschman observed that "a fairly regular alternation between
liberalism and conservatism -with each phase lasting from 15 to 20 years- was found to have
been a distinctive and positive characteristic of American politics since Independence." Id.
366. See id. at 10-11. Hirschman observed that "acts of consumption, as well as acts of
participation in public affairs, which are undertaken because they are expected to yield satisfac-
tion, also yield disappointment and dissatisfaction.... [A]ny pattern ofconsumption or oftime
use carries within itself, to use the hallowed metaphor, 'the seeds of its own destruction."' Id.
at 10.
367. See generally Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982). Legal commentators have attacked the public/private dichotomy, arguing that all
contract rights and property-based rights are themselves the product of state action and public
choice. As a result, there is no clear distinction between public and private acts. See Duncan
Kennedy, The Stages ofthe Decline ofthe Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349,
1351-52 (1982) (describing collapse of public/private distinction). Scholars from the Critical
Legal Studies movement contend that not only is the public/private distinction indefensible, but
it is an obscuring mechanism through which the state permits individuals to believe their
choices are private, when in fact all choices are the product of previous state action. See Nancy
Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1239-40
(1996) (summarizing position of Critical Legal Studies movement).
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Reform proposals advocating deregulation reflect public disappointment with
government regulation. This public dissatisfaction has resulted in a shifting
preference for private-ordering and market-oriented approaches.
Admittedly, securities regulation may have gone too far in attempting to
protect investors by imposing complicated, costly, and sometimes burdensome
regulations to achieve its objectives. In some situations, the costs may have
exceeded the benefits. The answer, however, is not deregulation. Reforms
short of selective deregulation could restore the balance and address concerns.
Congress... and the SEC369 have begun to deal with these concerns by adopt-
368. Renewed congressional interest in securities regulation is evidenced by the recent
passage of two major pieces of securities legislation. The National Securities Markets Improve-
ment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.), was intended to redraw the boundaries between federal and state regulation of
the securities industry by preempting state regulation of the mutual fund industry, limiting state
oversight of investment advisory firms, and reducing the role of the states in regulating the
primary offerings of larger corporations. See, e.g., Annual Review of Federal Securities
Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 759, 760-64 (1997); Robert G. Baguall & Kimble Cannon, The
NationalSecuritiesMarketsImprovementActof1996 Summary andDiscussion, 25 SEC.REG.
L.J. 3 (1997).
Congress also adopted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The stated goal of
this legislation was to redress perceived abuses in connection with shareholder litigation under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-369, at31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,730-31. The legislation
effected both substantive and procedural changes in the federal securities laws. See, e.g., John
W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Roadto the Private Securities
Litigation Reform.Act of1995, 51 Bus.LAW. 335 (1996); Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and
the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action
Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 81-88 (1997); Symposium on the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 975 (1996).
369. See, e.g., Brian M. McNamara & Robert A. Barron, Quarterly Survey of SEC
Rulemaking and Major Appellate Decisions, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 239-40 (1998) (SEC
adopted so-called "Plain English Rules" to give issuers guidance on to how make disclosure
documents clear, concise, and understandable); Brian M. McNamara & Robert A. Barron,
Quarterly Survey of SEC Rulemaking and Major Appellate Decisions, 25 SEc. REG. L.J. 450,
455-457 (1998) (SEC eliminated forty-four rules and four forms and amended other rules and
forms to simplify offering requirements); Robert A. Barron, Control andRestricted Securities,
25 SEC. REG. L.J. 210, 210-12 (1997) (SEC adopted amendments to reduce holding period for
restricted securities under Rule 144, which should result in more venture capital funds for start-
up companies and other private businesses); Brian M. McNamara & Robert A. Barron. Quar-
terly Survey ofSECRulemaking andMajor Appellate Decisions, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 108,110-14
(1997) (SEC revised its rules to streamline financial statement reporting requirements for
acquired and to-be-acquired businesses); SmallBusinesses: SECAdopts Small OfferingExemp-
tion Corresponding to California Exemption, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 606
(May 10, 1996) (SEC adopted Rule 1001, which is new exemption from federal registration
requirements intended to assist small businesses in raising capital); Small Businesses: SEC
Raises Total Assets Threshold Triggering '34 Act Registration, Reporting, 28 Sec. Reg. & L.
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ing reform measures to reduce costs and regulatory burdens. Additional
initiatives are under review.
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Moreover, public dissatisfaction with current regulatory programs and a
preference for market-oriented solutions do not mean that the market itself,
left to its own devices, will provide the optimum solution. The answer is not
to swing the pendulum back and adopt reactionary reform proposals, such as
selective deregulation, that would result in a return to the business-oriented,
laissez-faire principles that dominated this country during the late nineteenth
century. Rather than blindly surrendering to this reactionary cycle, we must
examine the source of dissatisfaction, evaluate the various regulatory reform
proposals in light of the values to be served by regulation, and search for a
solution that strikes a reasonable balance between the extremes. 7'
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 606 (May 10, 1996) (in change aimed at easing regulatory burdens on
small businesses, SEC raised threshold amount of assets company must have before it is
required to report under Exchange Act).
370. The SEC is considering a number of new initiatives designed to make substantial
changes in the regulation of the securities industry, including a number of initiatives to assist
small businesses. The agency has advocated the repeal or simplification of a large number of
existing regulations and is studying the feasibility of shifting the focus of the Securities Act
away from a system of registered offerings and toward a system of company registration. See
generally Brian L Lane, Current Issues andRulemaking Projects, ALI-ABA Course of Study,
WL SC67 ALI-ABA 249 (June 4, 1998).
371. AsHirschman observed, oscillating back and forth between extremes can beoverdone
and is unlikely to be constructive. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 365, at 132-34.
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